Talmud Rule: Graphics, Generalization and Refute

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hak Choi
Keyword(s):  
Talmud Rule

scholarly journals The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards

2004 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero ◽  
Antonio Villar
Keyword(s):  
Talmud Rule

Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 241-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toru Hokari ◽  
William Thomson
Keyword(s):  
Claims Problems ◽  
Talmud Rule

scholarly journals A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1045-1057 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero ◽  
Min-Hung Tsay ◽  
Chun-Hsien Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Upper Bounds ◽  
Lower And Upper Bounds ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Talmud Rule

From Jungle to Civilized Economy: The Power Foundation of Exchange Economy Equilibrium

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai E. Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Initial Endowment ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bankruptcy Problem ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Talmud Rule ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Walrasian Equilibria

Abstract This article explores the evolution of a civilized exchange economy from an anarchistic environment. I analyze a model of stochastic jungle bargaining mechanism and show that it implements the Talmud Rule allocation (Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler. 1985. “Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud.” Journal of Economic Theory 36 (2): 195–213.) in subgame perfect equilibrium. This Pareto-inefficient allocation constitutes the initial endowment of a stable exchange economy and supports stable Walrasian equilibria, implying that civilized economies could evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature without social contract or regulator. The moral implications of these results are also briefly discussed.

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