International Journal of Game Theory
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1432-1270, 0020-7276

Author(s):  
Ana Mauleon ◽  
Simon Schopohl ◽  
Akylai Taalaibekova ◽  
Vincent Vannetelbosch

AbstractWe study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both projects) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are increasing in the number of neighbors who choose the same project. In addition, players are either farsighted or myopic. Farsighted players anticipate the reactions of others while myopic players do not. We show that, when all players are farsighted, full coordination among the moderate players is reached except if there are stubborn players for both projects. When the population is mixed, the set of stable strategy profiles is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. In fact, turning myopic players into farsighted ones eliminates gradually the inefficient Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider a social planner who can improve coordination by means of two policy instruments: adding links to the network (socialization) and/or turning myopic players into farsighted ones (education).


Author(s):  
Makoto Shimoji

AbstractOriginating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single linear programming problem.


Author(s):  
Bas Dietzenbacher ◽  
Peter Sudhölter

AbstractThis paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.


Author(s):  
Andreas Darmann ◽  
Janosch Döcker ◽  
Britta Dorn ◽  
Sebastian Schneckenburger

AbstractSeveral real-world situations can be represented in terms of agents that have preferences over activities in which they may participate. Often, the agents can take part in at most one activity (for instance, since these take place simultaneously), and there are additional constraints on the number of agents that can participate in an activity. In such a setting, we consider the task of assigning agents to activities in a reasonable way. We introduce the simplified group activity selection problem providing a general yet simple model for a broad variety of settings, and start investigating its special case where upper and lower bounds of the groups have to be taken into account. We apply different solution concepts such as envy-freeness and core stability to our setting and provide a computational complexity study for the problem of finding such solutions.


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