From Jungle to Civilized Economy: The Power Foundation of Exchange Economy Equilibrium

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai E. Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Initial Endowment ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bankruptcy Problem ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Talmud Rule ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Walrasian Equilibria

Abstract This article explores the evolution of a civilized exchange economy from an anarchistic environment. I analyze a model of stochastic jungle bargaining mechanism and show that it implements the Talmud Rule allocation (Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler. 1985. “Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud.” Journal of Economic Theory 36 (2): 195–213.) in subgame perfect equilibrium. This Pareto-inefficient allocation constitutes the initial endowment of a stable exchange economy and supports stable Walrasian equilibria, implying that civilized economies could evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature without social contract or regulator. The moral implications of these results are also briefly discussed.

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hybrid Threats
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