scholarly journals Information and Coordination Frictions in Experimental Posted Offer Markets

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leif Helland ◽  
Espen R. Moen ◽  
Edgar Preugschat
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Franciosi ◽  
Praveen Kujal ◽  
Roland Michelitsch ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
Gang Deng


2021 ◽  
pp. 173-240
Keyword(s):  


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Zeng ◽  
James C. Cox ◽  
Moshe Dror
Keyword(s):  


1995 ◽  
Vol 105 (431) ◽  
pp. 938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Franciosi ◽  
Praveen Kujal ◽  
Roland Michelitsch ◽  
Vernon Smith ◽  
Gang Deng


1990 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Arlington W. Williams




2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-78
Author(s):  
Yasin Ozcelik ◽  
Zafer D. Ozdemir

Market transparency refers to the level of current trade information revealed to participants by market makers. This paper analyzes the effect of market transparency on the outcomes of posted-offer style Business-to-Business e-commerce markets. First, increasing market transparency improves the price-tracking ability of sellers, and results in higher efficiency. However, revelation of quantity information on transactions is not very crucial as opposed to price information. Second, although sellers extract significantly higher surplus (profit) than buyers can do in a posted-offer market, the difference vanishes with increasing market transparency. Lastly, sellers in posted-offer markets respond poorly to external demand shocks. Interestingly, the poor price-tracking performance of sellers hurts buyers more. In other words, seller profits are much less sensitive to demand shocks as compared to buyer surpluses.



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