scholarly journals Fairness: Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in Posted-Offer Markets

1995 ◽  
Vol 105 (431) ◽  
pp. 938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Franciosi ◽  
Praveen Kujal ◽  
Roland Michelitsch ◽  
Vernon Smith ◽  
Gang Deng
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Posted Offer

scholarly journals Fairness: Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in Posted-Offer Markets

2000 ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Franciosi ◽  
Praveen Kujal ◽  
Roland Michelitsch ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
Gang Deng
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Posted Offer

scholarly journals Excess demand functions, equilibrium prices, and existence of equilibrium

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam-Chau Wong
Keyword(s):  
Excess Demand ◽  
Existence Of Equilibrium ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

scholarly journals Research on Pricing Decision of Direct Sales Green Supply Chain Based on Consumers’ Valuation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yong-Gang Ye ◽  
Xiao-Feng Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Product Valuation

Consumer’s valuation of merchandise is an important factor affecting consumer buying behavior. When the consumer’s valuation exceeds the price of product, the consumer generally makes a decision to purchase the product; conversely, when the consumer’s estimate is lower than the price of product, the consumer will usually refuse to buy the product. From the perspective of consumer product valuation, this study assumed that the consumer’s product valuation obeys a uniform distribution, and a novel consumer demand function was proposed. On this basis, we studied enterprises’ pricing decisions in the supply chain of green agricultural products and obtained the equilibrium prices and optimal profits of the enterprises in several different scenarios, including Vertical Nash game model (VNM), firm A Stackelberg game model (FASM), firm B Stackelberg game model (FBSM), and cooperative game model (CM). In addition, the influence of parameters, such as green level, green preference payment coefficient, and green cost on the optimal profit, was discussed based on game theory and numerical simulation analysis. It was found that equilibrium prices always existed in several different scenarios, and when consumer’s green preference payment coefficient was large enough, the optimal profit of firm B was greater than the optimal profit of firm A. Furthermore, in CM, the sum of optimal profit of firm A and optimal profit of firm B is maximum for four scenarios. Finally, in the three competitive scenarios, green level, green preference payment coefficient, and green cost, have a positive or negative effect on the optimal profits of firm A or firm B. The research conclusions of this study provided theoretical support for the decision-making of enterprises and related management departments.

On the Role of Demand in Ricardo and Marshall

1991 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni A. Caravale
Keyword(s):  
Present Note ◽  
Classical Type ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
History Of Economics ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Supply Functions ◽  
Specific Object ◽  
History Of ◽  
Natural Equilibrium

The present note is a development of a paper I presented some four years ago at the 1987 meeting of the History of Economics Society (Caravale 1987), and that was later published in Rivista di Politico Economica in an expanded version (Caravale 1988). The aim of these two writings was to emphasize that—contrary to what is often maintained—demand conditions play a fundamental role in classical and classical-type theories. This role is different from that played by demand in neoclassical theories (where equilibrium prices are determined by demand and supply functions), and is so to speak “internal” to the theory of natural equilibrium since it is connected with the definition, for each situation, of the Smithian “point of effectual demand.” Before turning to the specific object of this note, let me recall very briefly the main points of the general thesis developed in the above-mentioned papers.

Posted-Offer Markets

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-240
Keyword(s):  
Posted Offer

scholarly journals Value and Prices in a Reinsurance Market

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavio Pressacco
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Classical Economic ◽  
Reinsurance Market

This paper concerns the Borch model of a reinsurance market seen as a model of an economy under uncertainty.In a market of this type the goods traded are unit coverings contingent to a particular state of nature (n-tuple of claims).Our idea is to regard the probability of a state of nature as a sort of intrinsic value of the related contingent covering. From this point of view we examine the role of the reinsurance market in modifying values in market equilibrium prices and other questions, related to this classical economic problem, in the particular case of a quadratic utility function for all companies.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

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