This book examines why partisan electoral interventions occur as well as their effects on the election results in countries in which the great powers intervened. A new dataset shows that the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one out of every nine elections between 1946 and 2000 in other countries in order to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties; the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections is just the latest example. Nevertheless, electoral interventions receive scant scholarly attention. This book develops a new theoretical model to answer both questions. It argues that electoral interventions are usually “inside jobs,” occurring only if a significant domestic actor within the target wants it. Likewise, electoral interventions won’t happen unless the intervening country fears its interests are endangered by another significant party or candidate with very different and inflexible preferences. As for the effects it argues that such meddling usually gives a significant boost to the preferred side, with overt interventions being more effective than covert ones in this regard. However, unlike in later elections, electoral interventions in founding elections usually harm the aided side. A multi-method framework is used in order to study these questions, including in-depth archival research into six cases in which the U.S. seriously considered intervening, the statistical analysis of the aforementioned dataset (PEIG), and a micro-level analysis of election surveys from three intervention cases. It also includes a preliminary analysis of the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections and the cyber-future of such meddling in general.
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