scholarly journals Quantum Decision Theory and the Ellsberg Paradox

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali al-Nowaihi ◽  
Sanjit Dhami ◽  
Mengxing Wei
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Ellsberg Paradox ◽  
Quantum Decision Theory

Quantum decision corrections for the neuroeconomics of irrational movement control and goal attainment

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin B. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Optimal Foraging ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Movement Control ◽  
Subjective Utility ◽  
Quantum Decision Theory

Abstract Quantum decision theory corrects categorical and propositional logic pathologies common to classic statistical goal-oriented reasoning, such as rational neuroeconomics-based optimal foraging. Within this ecosalient framework, motivation, perception, learning, deliberation, brain computation, and conjunctive risk-order errors may be understood for subjective utility judgments underlying either rational or irrational canonical decisions-actions used to choose, procure, and consume rewarding nutrition with variable fitness.

scholarly journals Process estimation in qubit systems: a quantum decision theory approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Maffeis ◽  
Seid Koudia ◽  
Abdelhakim Gharbi ◽  
Matteo G. A. Paris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Quantum Decision Theory

scholarly journals Processing Information in Quantum Decision Theory

Entropy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav Yukalov ◽  
Didier Sornette
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Quantum Decision Theory

scholarly journals ELLSBERG’S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bradley
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Marginal Utility ◽  
Bayesian Decision Theory ◽  
Ellsberg Paradox ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Diminishing Marginal Utility ◽  
Ellsberg’S Paradox

Abstract:What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a non-linear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox. While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian decision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible with it.

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