On Fitch’s Paradox

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artashes Akopyan
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox

On a side effect of solving Fitch's paradox by typing knowledge

Analysis ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Halbach
Keyword(s):  
Side Effect ◽  
Fitch’S Paradox

Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox

Studia Logica ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał Palczewski
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox

Fitch’s paradox and ceteris paribus modalities

Synthese ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 173 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Proietti ◽  
Gabriel Sandu
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox ◽  
Ceteris Paribus

Truthmaking, grounding and Fitch’s paradox

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Trueman
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox ◽  
Bad Company

Abstract Jago and Loss have recently used variations on Fitch's paradox to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and that every fact is grounded. In this paper, I show that Fitch's paradox can also be adapted to prove the exact opposite conclusions: no truth has a truthmaker, and no fact is grounded. All of these arguments are as dialectically effective as each other, and so they are all in bad company.

When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-191
Author(s):  
Ian McCready-Flora
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox ◽  
Subsequent Chapter ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Paradox Of Knowability

While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all appearances are true (as the Protagorean maintains), anytime people disagree we get a true contradiction. This argument seems clearly invalid: nothing guarantees that actual disagreement occurs over every matter of fact. The argument in fact works perfectly, I propose, because the Protagorean view falls prey to a version of Fitch's “paradox” of knowability. The proposed reading shows how Aristotle treats the Protagorean view at issue as an epistemic theory of truth distinct from the mere claim that all appearances are true (which other opponents put forward on different grounds) and reveals Aristotle's underlying concern with the modal collapse of possibility into actuality. The revised Protagorean view Aristotle confronts in a subsequent chapter is furthermore best understood as an attempt to avoid this Fitch-style result.

On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox

Erkenntnis ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 597-611
Author(s):  
Alessandro Giordani
Keyword(s):  
Fitch’S Paradox
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document