An Arithmetically Complete Predicate Modal Logic

This paper investigates a first-order extension of GL called \(\textup{ML}^3\). We outline briefly the history that led to \(\textup{ML}^3\), its key properties and some of its toolbox: the \emph{conservation theorem}, its cut-free Gentzenisation, the ``formulators'' tool. Its semantic completeness (with respect to finite reverse well-founded Kripke models) is fully stated in the current paper and the proof is retold here. Applying the Solovay technique to those models the present paper establishes its main result, namely, that \(\textup{ML}^3\) is arithmetically complete. As expanded below, \(\textup{ML}^3\) is a first-order modal logic that along with its built-in ability to simulate general classical first-order provability―"\(\Box\)" simulating the the informal classical "\(\vdash\)"―is also arithmetically complete in the Solovay sense.

Logic-Sensitivity of Aristotelian Diagrams in Non-Normal Modal Logics

Aristotelian diagrams, such as the square of opposition, are well-known in the context of normal modal logics (i.e., systems of modal logic which can be given a relational semantics in terms of Kripke models). This paper studies Aristotelian diagrams for non-normal systems of modal logic (based on neighborhood semantics, a topologically inspired generalization of relational semantics). In particular, we investigate the phenomenon of logic-sensitivity of Aristotelian diagrams. We distinguish between four different types of logic-sensitivity, viz. with respect to (i) Aristotelian families, (ii) logical equivalence of formulas, (iii) contingency of formulas, and (iv) Boolean subfamilies of a given Aristotelian family. We provide concrete examples of Aristotelian diagrams that illustrate these four types of logic-sensitivity in the realm of normal modal logic. Next, we discuss more subtle examples of Aristotelian diagrams, which are not sensitive with respect to normal modal logics, but which nevertheless turn out to be highly logic-sensitive once we turn to non-normal systems of modal logic.

NNIL-formulas revisited: Universal models and finite model property

NNIL-formulas, introduced by Visser in 1983–1984 in a study of $\varSigma _1$-subsitutions in Heyting arithmetic, are intuitionistic propositional formulas that do not allow nesting of implication to the left. The first results about these formulas were obtained in a paper of 1995 by Visser et al. In particular, it was shown that NNIL-formulas are exactly the formulas preserved under taking submodels of Kripke models. Recently, Bezhanishvili and de Jongh observed that NNIL-formulas are also reflected by the colour-preserving monotonic maps of Kripke models. In the present paper, we first show how this observation leads to the conclusion that NNIL-formulas are preserved by arbitrary substructures not necessarily satisfying the topo-subframe condition. Then, we apply it to construct universal models for NNIL. It follows from the properties of these universal models that NNIL-formulas are also exactly the formulas that are reflected by colour-preserving monotonic maps. By using the method developed in constructing the universal models, we give a new direct proof that the logics axiomatized by NNIL-axioms have the finite model property.

Justification awareness

We offer a new semantic approach to formal epistemology that incorporates two principal ideas: (i) justifications are prime objects of the model: knowledge and belief are defined evidence-based concepts; (ii) awareness restrictions are applied to justifications rather than to propositions, which allows for the maintaining of desirable closure properties. The resulting structures, Justification Awareness Models, JAMs, naturally include major justification models, Kripke models and, in addition, represent situations with multiple possibly fallible justifications which, in full generality, were previously off the scope of rigorous epistemic modeling.

Revisiting McKinsey's 'Syntactical' Construction of Modality

In 1945 J.C.C. McKinsey produced a ‘semantics’ for modal logic based on necessity defined in terms of validity. The present papers looks at how to update F.R. Drake’s completeness proof for McKinsey’s semantics by comparing McKinsey ‘models’ with the now standard Kripke models. It also looks at the motivation behind the system McKinsey called S4.1, but which we now call S4M; and use this motivation to produce a McKinsey semantics for that system. One lesson which emerges from this work is an appreciation of the superiority of the current possible worlds semantics based on frames and models, both in terms of an intuitive understanding of modality, and also in terms of the ease of working with particular systems.

Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

Symbolic model checking of public announcement protocols

We study the symbolic model checking problem against public announcement protocol logic (PAPL), featuring protocols with public announcements, arbitrary public announcements and group announcements. Technically, symbolic models are Kripke models whose accessibility relations are presented as programs described in a dynamic logic style with propositional assignments. We highlight the relevance of such symbolic models and show that the symbolic model checking problem against PAPL is A$_{\textrm{pol}}$Exptime-complete as soon as announcement protocols allow for either arbitrary announcements or iteration of public announcements. However, when both options are discarded, the complexity drops to Pspace-complete.