scholarly journals Computing Stackelberg Equilibrium with Memory in Sequential Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Aradhye ◽  
Branislav Bošanský ◽  
Michael Hlaváček

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2054-2061 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Karwowski ◽  
Jecek Mańdziuk

The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties of a particular game model. The method is based on iterative interleaving of the two following phases: (1) guided Monte Carlo Tree Search sampling of the Follower's strategy space and (2) building the Leader's behavior strategy tree for which the sampled Follower's strategy is an optimal response. The above solution scheme is evaluated with respect to expected Leader's utility and time requirements on three sets of interception games with variable characteristics, played on graphs. A comparison with three state-of-the-art MILP/LP-based methods shows that in vast majority of test cases proposed simulation-based approach leads to optimal Leader's strategies, while excelling the competitive methods in terms of better time scalability and lower memory requirements.



2015 ◽  
Vol 04 (S 01) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Solomons
Keyword(s):  


2012 ◽  
Vol E95-C (3) ◽  
pp. 382-394
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki OISHI ◽  
Shigekazu KIMURA ◽  
Eisuke FUKUDA ◽  
Takeshi TAKANO ◽  
Daisuke TAKAGO ◽  
...  


Author(s):  
Elena Paifelman ◽  
Gianluca Pepe ◽  
Antonio Carcaterra


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 728
Author(s):  
Cui Yong ◽  
Chen Haoran ◽  
Zhu Liang
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson

This chapter examines John Locke's theory of personal identity, which he has defined in terms of the reach of consciousness in beings who qualify as persons (being in particular fully self-conscious, able to think of past and future, and “capable of a law”). It starts with the notion that a person is an object of a certain sort, and must exemplify a certain sort of temporal continuity, if it is to continue to exist. Locke assumes that any candidate person has such continuity. The chapter also considers which parts of a subject of experience's continuous past are features or aspects or parts of the person that it now is before concluding with an analysis of Joseph Butler's incorrect identification of consciousness with memory in his objection to Locke's argument that a person can survive a change in its thinking substance even if its thinking substance is immaterial.



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