scholarly journals Vertical Restraints and Powerful Health Insurers: Exclusionary Conduct Masquerading as Managed Care?

1988 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances H. Miller
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etti G. Baranoff ◽  
Thomas W. Sager ◽  
Bo Shi ◽  
Dalit Baranoff

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 393-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Ho

I use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers. I include a simple profit-maximization framework and an additional effect: hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers (e.g., those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained) may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay. Hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining. I estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers. These results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining. (JEL G22, G34, I11, L25)


1988 ◽  
Vol 14 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 147-169
Author(s):  
Jonathan B. Baker

Two recent district court opinions consider whether affiliations among hospitals, doctors and health insurers — through contract or ownership — violate the antitrust laws. This Article applies a raising rivals’ costs framework to the facts of those cases in order to assess whether the practices at issue were unreasonable.


1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Becky Sutherland-Cornett ◽  
Bernard P. Henri ◽  
Brooke Hallowell

ASHA Leader ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-19
Author(s):  
Carol Polovoy
Keyword(s):  

ASHA Leader ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
Havens Laurie Alban
Keyword(s):  

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