The Role of Strategic Information Transmission in a Bargaining Model

1988 ◽  
Vol 98 (390) ◽  
pp. 50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Black ◽  
George Bulkley
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission

scholarly journals Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Wilson ◽  
Mikhail Golosov ◽  
Vasiliki Skreta ◽  
Aleh Tsyvinski
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission

scholarly journals Dynamic strategic information transmission

2014 ◽  
Vol 151 ◽  
pp. 304-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Golosov ◽  
Vasiliki Skreta ◽  
Aleh Tsyvinski ◽  
Andrea Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission

scholarly journals Strategic information transmission networks

2013 ◽  
Vol 148 (5) ◽  
pp. 1751-1769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Galeotti ◽  
Christian Ghiglino ◽  
Francesco Squintani
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Transmission Networks ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission

scholarly journals MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRÉDÉRIC KOESSLER ◽  
FRANÇOISE FORGES
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission ◽  
Bounded Number

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

scholarly journals Effects of Subjective Biases on Strategic Information Transmission

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 6040-6049
Author(s):  
Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla ◽  
Cedric Langbort ◽  
Tamer Basar
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission
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