Property theory and the revision theory of definitions

2000 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Orilia

§1. Introduction. Russell's type-theory can be seen as a theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) (in short, a property theory). It relies on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the property theorist's major problem, namely Russell's paradox, or, more generally, the paradoxes of predication. Type theory has arguably been the standard property theory for years, often taken for granted, and used in many applications. In particular, Montague [27] has shown how to use a type-theoretical property-theory as a foundation for natural language semantics.In recent years, it has been persuasively argued that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. Several type-free property theories, typically with fine-grained identity conditions for PRPs, have therefore been proposed as potential candidates to play a foundational role in natural language semantics, or for related applications in formal ontology and the foundations of mathematics (Bealer [6], Cocchiarella [18], Turner [35], etc.).Attempts have then been made to combine some such property theory with a Montague-style approach in natural language semantics. Most notably, Chierchia and Turner [15] propose a Montague-style semantic analysis of a fragment of English, by basically relying on the type-free system of Turner [35]. For a similar purpose Chierchia [14] relies on one of the systems based on homogeneous stratification due to Cocchiarella. Cocchiarella's systems have also been used for applications in formal ontology, inspired by Montague's account of quantifier phrases as, roughly, properties of properties (see, e.g., Cocchiarella [17], [19], Landini [25], Orilia [29]).

Author(s):  
Robin Cooper

AbstractWe present a view of perception as the classification of objects and events in terms of types in the sense of TTR, a Type Theory with Records. We argue that such types can be used to give a formal model of concepts and cognitive processing involving concepts. This yields a view that natural language semantics is based on our cognitive perceptual ability. The paper provides an overview of some key ideas in TTR including the important notion of record type. We suggest that record types can be used to model frames in a way that relates to the Düsseldorf notion of frame as well as those of Fillmore and Barsalou.


Author(s):  
Pauline Jacobson

This chapter examines the currently fashionable notion of ‘experimental semantics’, and argues that most work in natural language semantics has always been experimental. The oft-cited dichotomy between ‘theoretical’ (or ‘armchair’) and ‘experimental’ is bogus and should be dropped form the discourse. The same holds for dichotomies like ‘intuition-based’ (or ‘thought experiments’) vs. ‘empirical’ work (and ‘real experiments’). The so-called new ‘empirical’ methods are often nothing more than collecting the large-scale ‘intuitions’ or, doing multiple thought experiments. Of course the use of multiple subjects could well allow for a better experiment than the more traditional single or few subject methodologies. But whether or not this is the case depends entirely on the question at hand. In fact, the chapter considers several multiple-subject studies and shows that the particular methodology in those cases does not necessarily provide important insights, and the chapter argues that some its claimed benefits are incorrect.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-116
Author(s):  
Michael Mccord ◽  
Arendse Bernth

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