Place of articulation shifts in sound change: A gradual road to the unmarked

This paper investigates place of articulation shifts involving heterosyllabic C[non-coronal]C[coronal] clusters. Such phenomena are found, among other languages, in the diachrony of Italiot Greek, where three typologically different historical stages are observed: (a) no shifts; (b) dorsal > labial shift; (c) dorsal, labial > coronal shift. Drawing on Rice's (1994) model of the Place node and the markedness hierarchy dorsal ≺ labial ≺ coronal (with “≺” denoting ‘more marked than’) (de Lacy 2002), I maintain that these shifts reduce the markedness of codas. The gradual typological changes are accounted for in terms of Property Theory (Alber & Prince 2015).

הכל הבל in Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 12:8 – Descriptive metaphysics of properties as comparative-philosophical supplement

In this article, a supplementary yet original contribution is made to the ongoing attempts at refining ways of comparative-philosophical conceptual clarification of Qohelet’s claim that הבל הכל in 1:2 (and 12:8). Adopting and adapting the latest analytic metaphysical concerns and categories for descriptive purposes only, a distinction is made between הבל as property of הכל and the properties of הבל in relation to הכל. Involving both correlation and contrast, the second-order language framework is hereby extended to a level of advanced nuance and specificity for restating the meaning of the book’s first-order language on its own terms, even if not in them.Contribution: By considering logical, ontological, mereological and typological aspects of property theory in dialogue with appearances of הכל and of הבל in Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 12:8 and in-between, a new way is presented in the quest to explain why things in the world of the text are the way they are, or why they are at all.

GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The growing importance of intellectual property as an economic asset raises the issue of the content of intellectual property in the scientific discussions and the identification of scientific prerequisites for the formation and development of the intellectual property theory. The paper aims at the improvement of the conceptual and theoretical views on the economic category of intellectual property through establishing the dialectical interrelation with the concept of property. The authors propose considering intellectual property as a materially expressed result of the mental (intellectual) activity of a person, which invests its creator (author) or legal entities with the exclusive right for it, and it is confirmed by the relevant officially issued protection documents (patents or certificates) or statutory prescribed copyright norms. The research revealed the dichotomous nature of intellectual property. The study of property and intellectual property categories allowed establishing their dialectical opposition in terms of materiality and possibility of copying a legal object, the urgency and territorial limitation of property rights, and, most important, the dynamics of value in the process of consumption. However, the property and intellectual property categories also have a dialectical unity, which is not noted in the scientific literature. It is expressed in the mechanism of origin of property rights (in both cases, they are related to the problem of limited resources resulting in the necessity to choose the variant of an asset use), and in the mechanism of application of these rights, associated with the presence of both the right and the restrictions of this right, as well as liabilities of a copyright holder.

Property as Intangible Property

Historically, property theory has focused on real property as the premier example of property, reflecting the longstanding importance of land as a source of wealth and political power. This essay argues that it is time for property theorists to pay more attention to intangible property. It makes three main points. First, it emphasizes the contemporary economic importance of intangible property, as well as its increasing social importance in everyday life, especially in highly urbanized, developed countries. Second, it posits that the currently prevalent thing-based understanding of property is sufficiently capacious to embrace intangible property. Third, it speculates about why property theory has remained largely focused on tangible forms of property. It concludes by underscoring potential benefits of property theory paying greater attention to intangible property: an expanded focus on intangible property might lead to greater recognition of the constrained character of property in the modern urbanized world, and greater acknowledgment of the potential for property—albeit likely in a constrained form—to play a role in addressing the consequences of modern technology.

Property Theory of Corporate Law

The dominant view of the corporation in legal scholarship is contractarian, one that sees the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” among the various suppliers of inputs to the business, such as investors, creditors, and employees. According to this view, the holders of common stock—those who are traditionally the primary focus of corporate law—are not the owners of the corporation, but just one of many contractual claimants. As a result, the corporation is a free-floating nexus of contracts with no property interests in the corporation itself or its assets. Thus, corporate law is seen as essentially a specialized branch of contract law. The contractarian metaphor has largely persuaded the academy and much of the corporate law bench, evidenced by the regularity in which Delaware courts interpret charter documents as “contracts.” Courts and commentators alike regard corporate law as essentially a set of “off-the-rack” contractual default rules provided by the state. Yet the contractarian metaphor has struggled to account for some of the most fundamental features of corporate law. For example, the nexus of contracts view fails to adequately explain why fiduciary duties attach uniquely to shareholders and not to other contractual claimants on the corporation. Equally important, the nexus of contracts approach also fails to account for the many in rem features of the corporation that contract law could not easily replicate. There is a piece missing in the contractarian account of the corporation. This Article argues that property law provides the missing piece of the contractarian puzzle in demarcating the boundaries of corporate law and explaining the distinctive features of it. In the property theory, the corporation is an ownership structure—a device for turning a messy set of in personam claims into an orderly package of in rem property rights, called “shares.” The in rem structure depersonalizes these rights, allowing them to be divided and transferred without contractual assent and without entangling the personal attributes of the holder. The key to the proprietary nature of this ownership interest is the residual control—voting rights—that solidify the status of common stock as a property interest rather than a contractual interest. The property theory’s assertion that claims on the corporation are a mix of property and contract rights provides traction in otherwise slippery areas of corporate law. If there is a line to be drawn between contract and property, this dividing line identifies the boundaries of distinctively corporate law from contract law. Accordingly, the rationale for shareholder-only fiduciary duties is not primarily that shareholders are the residual claimants in the economic sense, but that they have a residual control right constituting an ownership interest unique among corporate claimants. The property theory of corporate law best explains many features of corporate law and clarifies otherwise murky line drawing exercises in defining the scope of fiduciary duties.