Minimal dualism and epistemic approach
2021 ◽
Vol 6
(1)
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pp. 86-90
In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticizing the conceivability argument. Secondly, the epistemic approach restricts the conceivability of creatures, the possibility of which is incompatible with the minimal dualism
2013 ◽
Vol 107
(1)
◽
pp. 104-122
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Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 04
(04)
◽
pp. 160-166
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 28
(3)
◽
pp. 221-250
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):