Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Convergence and Condorcet Efficiency

Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science ◽

10.4204/eptcs.112.6 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 112 ◽

pp. 17-24 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Umberto Grandi ◽

Andrea Loreggia ◽

Francesca Rossi ◽

Kristen Brent Venable ◽

Toby Walsh

Keyword(s):

Condorcet Efficiency ◽

Iterative Voting

Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score

Algorithmic Decision Theory - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 181-192 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Umberto Grandi ◽

Andrea Loreggia ◽

Francesca Rossi ◽

Kristen Brent Venable ◽

Toby Walsh

Keyword(s):

Condorcet Efficiency ◽

Iterative Voting

An iterative voting method based on word density for text classification

Proceedings of the International Conference on Web Intelligence, Mining and Semantics - WIMS '11 ◽

10.1145/1988688.1988751 ◽

2011 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jiaxun Wang ◽

Chunping Li

Keyword(s):

Text Classification ◽

Iterative Voting ◽

Voting Method

Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity

Studies in Choice and Welfare - Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_5 ◽

2010 ◽

pp. 157-198

Author(s):

William V. Gehrlein ◽

Dominique Lepelley

Keyword(s):

Condorcet Efficiency

Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency

Advances in Economic Design ◽

10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_3 ◽

2003 ◽

pp. 53-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

William V. Gehrlein

Keyword(s):

Scoring Rules ◽

Condorcet Efficiency

A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

Public Choice ◽

10.1007/bf00127534 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 47 (2) ◽

pp. 389-403 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Samuel Merrill

Keyword(s):

Statistical Model ◽

Spatial Model ◽

Condorcet Efficiency

Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?

Theory and Decision ◽

10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 58 (2) ◽

pp. 145-185 ◽

Cited By ~ 37

Author(s):

Davide P. Cervone ◽

William V. Gehrlein ◽

William S. Zwicker

Keyword(s):

Scoring Rule ◽

Condorcet Efficiency

CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency

Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic ◽

10.1515/9781400859504.64 ◽

1988 ◽

pp. 64-78 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Strategic Voting ◽

Condorcet Efficiency

Convergence of Iterative Voting Under Restrictive Dynamics for Plurality Rule: A Review

2018 IEEE 21st International Multi-Topic Conference (INMIC) ◽

10.1109/inmic.2018.8595530 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Saira Sultan ◽

Al Syeda Maham Huda ◽

Afsana Durrani ◽

Hadia Bibi ◽

Neelam Gohar

Keyword(s):

Plurality Rule ◽

Iterative Voting

Condorcet Efficiency of Borda Rule under the Dual Culture Condition

Social Science Research ◽

10.1006/ssre.1998.0632 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 36-44 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

William V Gehrlein

Keyword(s):

Culture Condition ◽

Dual Culture ◽

Borda Rule ◽

Condorcet Efficiency

Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012205 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 33 ◽

pp. 2205-2212

Author(s):

Anaëlle Wilczynski

Keyword(s):

Public Opinion ◽

Social Network ◽

Incomplete Information ◽

Strategic Voting ◽

Descriptive Model ◽

Model Based ◽

The Social ◽

Public Opinion Polls ◽

Opinion Polls ◽

Iterative Voting

This article deals with strategic voting under incomplete information. We propose a descriptive model, inspired by political elections, where the information about the vote intentions of the electorate comes from public opinion polls and a social network, modeled as a graph over the voters. The voters are assumed to be confident in the poll and they update the communicated results with the information they get from their relatives in the social network. We consider an iterative voting model based on this behavior and study the associated “poll-confident” dynamics. In this context, we ask the question of manipulation by the polling institute.