The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation

2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-185
Author(s):  
David B. Hershenov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Backward Causation

Causal Paradoxes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
Causal Loop ◽  
Ex Nihilo ◽  
Backward Causation

Chapter 5 surveys the various causal paradoxes of time travel. Section 1 introduces the concept of a causal loop and reviews some of the standard arguments against backward causation. Sections 2 focuses on the bootstrapping paradox, and the question of whether or not time travel allows for self-caused events. Section 3 addresses the ex nihilo paradox, and the question of whether or not time travel allows for uncaused events. Section 4 looks at the restoration paradox, and the question of how to understand the life cycle of an object in a causal loop. Section 5 considers D. H. Mellor’s frequency-based argument against causal loops. Section 6 discusses Michael Tooley’s counterfactual-based argument against backward causation.

Backward Causation in Defence of Free Will

Mind ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol XCIV (374) ◽  
pp. 210-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER FORREST
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Backward Causation

Backward causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactuals

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tooley
Keyword(s):  
Backward Causation

Is There Backward Causation in Classical Electrodynamics?

1977 ◽  
Vol 74 (8) ◽  
pp. 475-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adolf Grünbaum ◽  
Allen I. Janis ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Classical Electrodynamics ◽  
Backward Causation

How to Make Things Have Happened

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Nerlich
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Causal Direction ◽  
The World ◽  
Rich Sense ◽  
Present Argument ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Temporal Direction ◽  
Backward Causation

Might something I do now make something have happened earlier? This paper is about an argument which concludes that I might. Some arguments ([3], [27]) about “backward causation” conclude that the world could have been the kind of place in which actions make things have happened earlier. The present argument says that it is that kind of place: that we actually are continually doing things that really make earlier things have happened. The argument is not new (see e.g. [31]). It sees temporal direction as logically independent of any direction which necessary and sufficient conditions may have and it sees causal direction as properly deriving from the latter. Thus the directions of time and of making things happen need not coincide and, as it turns out, do not actually coincide in fact. There are examples of events which are sufficient, in a suitably rich sense, for the occurrence of earlier events; hence they make the earlier events happen. My purpose in this paper is to lend support to the argument by filling in some details which ‘backward sufficient conditions’ may lay claim to.

Backward Causation

2019 ◽  
pp. 121-136
Author(s):  
Jan Faye
Keyword(s):  
Backward Causation

Purposiveness in nature: Hegel and Spinoza on anthropomorphism and backward causation

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-478
Author(s):  
Karen Koch
Keyword(s):  
Backward Causation
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