On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism

In a recent paper, Pettigrew (2021) reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al. (2009). But Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.

What Makes Behavioral Measures of Consciousness Subjective and Direct?

This article addresses two issues: the distinction between objective and subjective measures and the directness of such measures. It is argued that the distinction is unambiguous only when based on a methodological criterion (i.e. the threshold utilized by the measures) rather than a semantic one (i.e. their referring either to the world or to the participant’s inner states). Different senses of directness are discussed: metaphysical (which seems to rest on a category error), methodological (the only unambiguously defined one, though relating ‘directly’ to performance rather than awareness), semantic (which appears gradable), and causal.

Speculation Made Material: Experimental Archaeology & Maker’s Knowledge

Experimental archaeology is often understood both as testing hypotheses about processes shaping the archaeological record and as generating tacit knowledge. Considering lithic technologies, I examine the relationship between these conceptions. Experimental archaeology is usefully understood via ‘maker’s knowledge’: archaeological experiments generate embodied know-how enabling archaeological hypotheses to be grasped and challenged, further well-positioning archaeologists to generate integrated interpretations. Finally, experimental archaeology involves ‘material speculation’: the constraints and affordances of archaeologists and their materials shape productive exploration of the capacities of objects and human skill in ways relevant to archaeological questions.

The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations

Several philosophers have argued that to capture the generality of certain scientific explanations, we must count mathematical facts among their explanantia. I argue that we can better understand these explanations by adopting a more nuanced stance toward mathematical representations, recognizing the role of mathematical representation schemata in representing highly abstract features of physical systems. It is by picking out these abstract but non-mathematical features that explanations appealing to mathematics achieve a high degree of generality. The result is a rich conception of the role of mathematics in scientific explanations that does not require us to treat mathematical facts as explanantia.

Are Points (Necessarily) Unextended?

Since Euclid defined a point as “that which has no part” it has been widely assumed that points are necessarily unextended. It has also been assumed that this is equivalent to saying that points or, more properly speaking, degenerate segments, have length zero. We challenge these assumptions by providing models of Euclidean geometry where the points are extended despite the fact that the degenerate segments have null lengths, and observe that whereas the extended natures of the points are not recognizable in the given models, they can be recognized and characterized by structures that are suitable expansions of the models.

Perspectival Instruments

Despite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the claim that ‘scientific instruments are perspectival’ has received little critical attention. I show that this claim is best understood as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different perspectives. When closely analysed, instead of constituting a novel epistemic challenge, this dependence can be exploited to mount novel strategies for resolving two old epistemic problems: conceptual relativism and theory ladeness. The novel content of this paper consists in articulating and developing these strategies by introducing two fine-grained notions of perspectives as the key units of analysis: ‘broad perspectives’ and ‘narrow perspectives’

Symmetries as Humean Metalaws

Symmetry principles are a central part of contemporary physics, yet there has been surprisingly little metaphysical work done on them. This paper develops the Wignerian treatment of symmetries as higher-order laws – metalaws – within a Humean framework of lawhood. Lange has raised two obstacles to Humean metalaws, and the paper shows that the account has the resources available to respond to both. It is argued that this framework for Humean metalaws stands as an example of naturalistic metaphysics, able to bring Humeanism into contact with the practice of actual science without giving up on the central denial of necessary connections.

On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions including countably infinite partitions.