scholarly journals Reaffirming the Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 87-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Hindriks ◽  
Barteld Kooi ◽  
Analysis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Blaauw

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

I consider a serious objection to the knowledge account of assertion and develop a response. In the process I introduce important new data on prompting assertion, which all theorists working in the area should take note of.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 78 (5) ◽  
pp. 977-978 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Pelling

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) says that knowledge is the norm of assertion: you may assert a proposition only if you know that it’s true. The primary support for KAA is an explanatory inference from a broad range of linguistic data. The more data that KAA well explains, the stronger the case for it, and the more difficult it is for the competition to keep pace. In this paper we critically assess a purported new linguistic datum, which, it has been argued, KAA well explains. We argue that KAA does not well explain it.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts.


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