Duties and Choices in Philanthropic Giving

Kant held that everyone has a general duty to promote the happiness of others as well as a more stringent duty to help those in distress when one easily can. These are duties of “practical love”: duties to act, not to feel. The general duty does not specify whose happiness to promote or the means and extent of obligatory helping. Several objections from contemporary philosophers are addressed: (1) that Kant’s principle of beneficence as Hill presents it is too “anemic” (David Cummiskey) (2) that Kant requires us to devalue our own happiness (Michael Slote), and (3) that Kant fails to acknowledge that some acts are morally good to do but not required (J. O. Urmson). Then this essay discusses briefly how other moral considerations may affect the application of Kant’s principles to particular cases of philanthropic giving: justice, respect, the kind of help needed, and the motives of the giver.

Contemporary Consequentialist Theories of Virtue

Virtue consequentialism is the view that whether a character trait is a virtue or a vice depends on the value of its consequences. This chapter first briefly traces the historical development of virtue consequentialism from John Locke through G. E. Moore and spells out the different ways in which the view has been formulated. It is argued that the best version of virtue consequentialism is a scalar, contrastive version according to which there are no absolute facts about which character traits are virtues. The chapter then examines arguments in favor of virtue consequentialism by Julia Driver, such as the argument that there are virtues of ignorance, and arguments against by Michael Slote, Robert Adams, and Todd Calder.

Impeccability and perfect virtue

Whatever else a theory of impeccability assumes about the moral life of heavenly agents, it seems to imply something about the type of actions possible for such agents, along with the quality of their moral characters. Regarding these characters, there are many that have argued impeccable and heavenly agents must also be perfectly virtuous agents. Michael Slote has recently argued, however, that perfect virtue is impossible. Assuming Slote's argument is successful, a theory of impeccability that relies on the possibility of perfect virtue would be greatly harmed, even to the point of incoherence. My intent here is to defend the coherence of the doctrine of impeccability, at least as it applies to the moral life of heavenly agents.

O Cuidado Empático: Contribuições para a Ética e Sua Interface com a Educação Moral na Formação em Saúde

RESUMO O presente artigo apresenta alguns pontos essenciais do pensamento do filósofo Michael Slote em sua obra “The ethics of care and empathy”. Situamos a sua produção no contexto em que a ética do cuidado foi desenvolvida e problematizada, evidenciando, sobretudo, a questão de gênero que atravessa essa perspectiva ética. Assim, convocamos autores e autoras que dialogam estreitamente com as questões levantadas por Slote como interlocutores fundamentais para se pensar a empatia como componente fundamental da ética do cuidado. Em sequência, resgatamos o sentido ontológico do cuidado e da responsabilidade, correlacionando-os com a prática do cuidado em saúde. Ao final, apresentamos um caso paradigmático para um debate concreto da ética do cuidado e empatia no âmbito da educação moral, destacando sua importância no processo de formação dos profissionais de saúde no Brasil.