Later Moore and Whitehead Towards Categorial Pluralism

This chapter provides the first account of G.E. Moore’s and A.N. Whitehead’s realization that the particular–universal distinction was neither clear nor inevitable. Moore’s epiphany came during his 1910–11 Morley College lectures. Reflection upon Bradley’s regress revealed to Moore that relations and relational properties are logically heterogeneous—Moore was led to the conclusion that the category of universals is no more than a ragbag of utterly different kinds of thing. Meanwhile Whitehead argued that no binary scheme, such as the particular–universal distinction, is adequate to the logical variety of natural elements disclosed to us in experience.

What Is It Like to Experience a Third Man? The Phenomenological Bradley and How to Solve It

This chapter first discusses a problem that is central to accounts of phenomenal unity, which is here called the phenomenological Bradley (PB). Basically, the problem is to explain how two phenomenal parts can be connected to each other (without treating this “connectedness” as a primitive relation about which one cannot say more). This problem is structurally similar to a problem known as “Bradley’s regress” in metaphysics. Considering possible solutions to the metaphysical version of the problem is at least heuristically fruitful for the project at hand, because these solutions can, to some extent, also be applied to the phenomenological version of the problem. In particular, the chapter presents four possible solutions to PB and draws connections to historical precursors and existing accounts of phenomenal unity. After that, the mélange model is proposed, which suggests a way in which different possible solutions to PB can be integrated.