What Is It Like to Experience a Third Man? The Phenomenological Bradley and How to Solve It

This chapter first discusses a problem that is central to accounts of phenomenal unity, which is here called the phenomenological Bradley (PB). Basically, the problem is to explain how two phenomenal parts can be connected to each other (without treating this “connectedness” as a primitive relation about which one cannot say more). This problem is structurally similar to a problem known as “Bradley’s regress” in metaphysics. Considering possible solutions to the metaphysical version of the problem is at least heuristically fruitful for the project at hand, because these solutions can, to some extent, also be applied to the phenomenological version of the problem. In particular, the chapter presents four possible solutions to PB and draws connections to historical precursors and existing accounts of phenomenal unity. After that, the mélange model is proposed, which suggests a way in which different possible solutions to PB can be integrated.

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of this book, starting with a summary of the account of phenomenal unity developed here. The summary also contains pointers to all other chapters. Readers who are interested in a particular part of the account will find the reference here. The other sections outline and discuss some philosophical background assumptions (e.g., on representationalism, phenomenal consciousness, access unity, and interdisciplinary research).

Think Globally, Experience Locally?

This chapter explores how accounts of phenomenal unity can not only satisfy the phenomenality constraint, but also a version of globality. Global phenomenal unity could then be called phenomenal holism. First, different relevant versions of globality are discussed, as well as notions of holism that can be applied to consciousness. According to accounts of strong phenomenal holism, every phenomenal part of a phenomenal field depends for its existence on all other phenomenal parts of the same phenomenal field. It is argued that accounts which defend such a strong phenomenal holism are ultimately not tenable. Hence, the globality constraint can only be used in its weaker, relaxed versions. It is suggested that a substantial version of phenomenal holism should combine relaxed versions of globality with the assumption that experienced wholes are hierarchically ordered. Furthermore, three features that make this idea more specific are identified: Multiplicity, Graduality, and Invariance. Finally, the ideas presented in this chapter are wrapped up by presenting the regularity account of phenomenal unity (RPU).

Framing the Problem of Phenomenal Unity (PPU)

This chapter lays the conceptual foundation for the rest of the book. The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) is defined and a general path to its solution is proposed. Apart from that, the chapter discusses the relation between synchronic and diachronic phenomenal unity (i.e., unity at a time and unity over time). Finally, a list of requirements on accounts of phenomenal unity is provided, in order to constrain the class of possible answers to PPU. Any adequate account of phenomenal unity should at least satisfy the following three constraints: Phenomenality, globality, and necessity.

The Regularity Account of Phenomenal Unity

This chapter presents the regularity account of phenomenal unity (RPU). The basic idea of RPU is that when the brain tracks a regularity that is predictive of different features (or of different objects or events), there will be an experienced connection between those features (or the respective objects or events). We can then say that the regularity connects those features (or objects or events). According to RPU, unity comes in degrees, and in ordinary conscious experience we find a hierarchy of experienced wholes. This chapter provides a preliminary taxonomy of experienced wholes, with many examples. Drawing on formal concepts of the predictive processing framework, a formal description of possible computational underpinnings of experienced wholeness is given. Finally, a rigorous formulation of the mélange model (first proposed in chapter 4) is provided.

Consciousness and Predictive Processing

Predictive processing (PP) is not a theory of consciousness. Hence, it is not obvious that PP should have any relevance to research on consciousness. A first promising possibility opens up if we consider the ambitious assumption that PP is a general theory of brain function. If the brain’s function is to minimize prediction error (just as the heart’s function is to pump blood), as Jakob Hohwy (2015) suggests, then it might well be that the computational processes underlying consciousness can usefully be described within the PP framework. This chapter focuses on (i) how PP accounts for attention, and what this suggests with regards to the relation between attention and consciousness (e.g., how volitional attention may change the contents of consciousness); (ii) furthermore, it is suggested that PP can provide a unifying perspective on some proposed functions and theories of consciousness (such as global workspace theory, attention schema theory, and integrated information theoy).

Predictive Processing

This chapter provides an introduction to predictive processing (PP), with a focus on its relation to Bayesian inference and the more general framework provided by Karl Friston’s free-energy principle (FEP). Philosophical implications of PP and FEP are discussed. In particular, it is argued that PP posits genuine representations, and that FEP questions whether the conceptual distinction between action and perception is useful when it comes to understanding their neuro-computational underpinnings. Finally, it is argued that PP supports the view that the mind is to some extent secluded from the external world and that perception is indirect because it is based on genuinely inferential processes.

Putting It All Together

What is phenomenal unity, and to what extent is consciousness phenomenally unified? No easy answers to these questions can be provided, because first the questions have to be formulated more perspicuously (which the first part of this book has attempted to do). This chapter presents, as succinctly as possible, the main results of this monograph. This involves explaining what the problem of phenomenal unity is, what it is not, how it can be solved, and which solutions have been explored and developed here. Finally, some important topics and problems that have not been investigated in detail are highlighted (e.g., mental action and cognitive phenomenology), thereby offering suggestions for future research.

Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity

This chapter discusses a common conception of phenomenal unity, the single state conception (SSC). The intuition underlying SSC is that phenomenal unity goes along with the existence of a single conscious state that encompasses all of the subject’s phenomenal parts. A prominent example of SSC is Tim Bayne’s mereological account of phenomenal unity. It is argued that SSC does not solve the problem of phenomenal unity (PPU). Instead, it raises questions which pose additional problems. Moreover, these problems do not help to make progress on PPU, but can be regarded as red herrings.

Representational Holism

This chapter discusses ways in which the problem of phenomenal unity can be analyzed on the representationalist level of description. Having characterized phenomenal unity as a kind of holism in the previous chapter, the aim is now to determine how collections of (phenomenal) representations can be holistic and how this holism can make a phenomenal difference. The chapter is structured as follows. First, relevant features of the representationalist level of description are explained. This is followed by a discussion of how the experienced self can be analyzed in terms of a global self-representation, which constitutes a phenomenal point of view (an experienced first-person perspective). Then the question of how the existence of a hierarchy of experienced wholes can be justified on purely theoretical grounds is explored, by asking how a hierarchy of representation increases the efficiency of the system. Finally, it is suggested that measures of (dynamical) complexity, like causal density and integrated information, could be used to operationalize the notion of representational holism.