folk theorems
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2021 ◽  
Vol 125 ◽  
pp. 79-93
Author(s):  
Andrea Attar ◽  
Eloisa Campioni ◽  
Thomas Mariotti ◽  
Gwenaël Piaser
Keyword(s):  


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850012
Author(s):  
Miguel Aramendia ◽  
Quan Wen

In obtaining the classical folk theorems for repeated games, the players must collectively coordinate their actions, even after someone deviates. In this paper, we explore the impacts of defensive plays on the set of equilibrium payoffs when all players have sufficiently high discount factor. Once some player deviates, everyone else will play the continuation game defensively by refusing to coordinate with the deviator and hence always choose their best responses in all subsequent periods. We show that this line of reasoning can significantly limit what can be supported by equilibrium in certain classes of repeated games. We characterize the set of limiting equilibrium payoffs under defensive plays.



2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 389-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiran Rachmilevitch


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Attar ◽  
Eloisa Campioni ◽  
Thomas Mariotti ◽  
Gwenaël Piaser
Keyword(s):  


2018 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 10-15
Author(s):  
Flavio Delbono ◽  
Luca Lambertini


2016 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyee Deb ◽  
Julio González-Díaz ◽  
Jérôme Renault


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 539-543
Author(s):  
Joseph Auslander


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavio Delbono ◽  
Luca Lambertini
Keyword(s):  


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Compte ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 1345-1356 ◽  
Author(s):  
VERA ANGELOVA ◽  
LISA V. BRUTTEL ◽  
WERNER GÜTH ◽  
ULRICH KAMECKE


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