The Beautiful and the Good

This chapter starts with the argument that the ancient Greek term to kalon (and its Latin equivalent honestum) can be read as having an aesthetic meaning. This discussion leads to the discussion of the argument ‘that only the beautiful is the good’ (μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι‎). The reconstruction suggests that, despite the fact that different interpretations of this argument are given in the doxographical material, the syllogism which accompanied the argument in the original Chrysippean version points to a very specific idea. In this argument, beauty plays the role of a distinguishing sign peculiar to the true good. Beauty signifies true goodness and makes it distinct from only apparent goodness. It supports the Stoic tenet that virtue is the only genuine good by claiming that beauty distinguishes true good from other, only apparent, goods.

The categorical role of structurally iconic signs

Goldin-Meadow & Brentari (G-M&B) argue that, for sign language users, gesture – in contrast to linguistic sign – is iconic, highly variable, and similar to spoken language co-speech gesture. We discuss two examples (telicity and absolute gradable adjectives) that challenge the use of these criteria for distinguishing sign from gesture.

Pros and cons of blurring gesture-language lines: An evolutionary linguistic perspective

The target article's emphasis on distinguishing sign from gesture may resolve one important objection to gesture-first theories of language evolution. However, this approach risks undervaluing the gradual progression from nonlanguage to language over hominin evolution, and in emerging sign systems today. I call for less emphasis on drawing boundaries and more emphasis on understanding the processes of change.