Beauty in Stoic Theological Arguments

This chapter is dedicated to analysing theological arguments in which aesthetic vocabulary plays a role. In these arguments, the beauty of the world is used to make an inference about its rational generation (an argument from design). To be precise, the arguments state that the presence of beauty in the world indicates that the world must have been generated by a rational principle and not by the random motion of atoms (as argued by the Epicureans). The chapter examines how beauty is used to form an inference here and investigates what theoretical implications this usage underpins. The findings here show some coherence with the findings in the previous chapters, especially in regard to the notion of good order or, to be more precise, well-functioning order. Thus, a systematic Stoic aesthetic theory begins to emerge.

The Problem of Indifferents

This chapter is focused the Stoic value theory. The Stoics notoriously claim that only virtue is good, while the only vice is bad and everything else, including health, wealth, beauty and life itself, are mere indifferents. The inclusion of beauty in this list seems to show that the Stoics were not interested in theorising beauty. A thorough reading of the material shows that beauty is not treated as if it was of no interest in general; the evidence only shows that it is an inferior value to virtue. This interpretation is supported by other evidence, including the texts of later Roman Stoics, such as Epictetus. Most importantly, this interpretation shows that the Stoic value theory and aesthetics are not mutually exclusive areas of study.

Beauty and Its Problems: Introduction

This chapter discusses various philosophical problems that form a relevant background for studying Stoic aesthetics. It starts with W. Tatarkiewicz’s claim that the Stoic concept of beauty is one of three distinct ways of understanding beauty in European history. Second, Paul Oskar Kristeller’s famous claim that there was no aesthetics per se until the 18th century is discussed, arguing that some of the issues that preoccupied the Stoics are also dealt with by contemporary aesthetics as well. This is followed by a discussion of some general philosophical issues concerning beauty, especially focusing on topics of the relationship between moral and aesthetic values and the possibility of metaphysical unity of all the manifestations of beauty. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the scope of this study and detailed summaries of chapter content.

Aesthetics in Stoicism and Stoicism in Aesthetics

The Stoic definition of beauty and the way in which beauty vocabulary is used in various arguments are remarkably consistent. This coherence suggests that the Stoic engagement with this area of philosophy must have been thorough and substantial. The chapter also presents a discussion of various prominent beauty theories in antiquity and compares them with the Stoic views. The figures discussed include Polycleitus, Vitruvius, Philolaus of Croton, Plato, Aristotle. The comparisons show that the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria was a distinct theory that accounted for aesthetic properties in reductive terms, that is, as a functional structure. It rivalled the Platonic accounts in which Forms played the central role. Plotinus’ attack on Stoicism shows that this rivalry lasted for a long time, and that while Platonism dominated the philosophical scene in late antiquity, Stoic views survived in other contexts. An analysis of the account of beauty found in the medical writings of Galen is used to support this claim.

The Stoic Definition of Beauty as Summetria

The chapter is dedicated to the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria. The definition theories beauty as a property that supervenes on the composition of non-aesthetic properties. In addition to the analysis of the definition itself, the chapter also discusses the criticism that Plotinus levelled at the Stoic definition of beauty, namely, that their theory cannot account for why a well-organised virtue, but not a well-organised vice, possesses beauty. It is suggestion that the notion of functional composition, which emerged from discussions on previous chapters, would afford the Stoics a response to this Plotinian critique. The Stoic definition of beauty is best understood as the claim that aesthetic properties supervene on two aspects of an object: (i) the formal properties of the object (summetria of parts with each other) and (ii) the functional properties of the object (summetria of parts with the whole). The definition states that in order for an object to be beautiful, it must possess a harmonious composition for the kind of object that it is.

‘The wise man is no true Scotsman’: The Stoics on Human Beauty

This chapter is dedicated to the so-called Stoic paradox stating that only the wise man is beautiful, while young, conventionally attractive youths, are not. Plutarch’s testimonial and critique of these views imply that they commit what in contemporary terms is sometimes called the ‘No True Scotsman’ fallacy, that is, an arbitrary redefinition of aesthetic terms. The chapter builds an argument that this criticism is not entirely fair by presenting a more charitable interpretation of these claims. The interpretation involves the notion of aesthetic functionality, that is, the idea that an object’s aesthetic value is determined in reference to the kind of an object it is. This reading of the Stoic wise man paradox is consistent with the central Stoic tenets about virtue and happiness.

The Beautiful and the Good

This chapter starts with the argument that the ancient Greek term to kalon (and its Latin equivalent honestum) can be read as having an aesthetic meaning. This discussion leads to the discussion of the argument ‘that only the beautiful is the good’ (μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι‎). The reconstruction suggests that, despite the fact that different interpretations of this argument are given in the doxographical material, the syllogism which accompanied the argument in the original Chrysippean version points to a very specific idea. In this argument, beauty plays the role of a distinguishing sign peculiar to the true good. Beauty signifies true goodness and makes it distinct from only apparent goodness. It supports the Stoic tenet that virtue is the only genuine good by claiming that beauty distinguishes true good from other, only apparent, goods.