The price of anarchy in loss systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shoshana Anily ◽  
Moshe Haviv
Keyword(s):  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Loss Systems

The one-level functional equation of multi-rate loss systems

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harro L. Hartmann ◽  
Martin Knoke
Keyword(s):  
Functional Equation ◽  
Loss Systems ◽  
The One ◽  
Rate Loss

Performance of Faulty Loss Systems with Persistent Connections

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Patch ◽  
Thomas Taimre ◽  
Yoni Nazarathy
Keyword(s):  
Loss Systems

A microsimulation based analysis of the price of anarchy in traffic routing: The enhanced Braess network case

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Belov ◽  
Konstantinos Mattas ◽  
Michail Makridis ◽  
Monica Menendez ◽  
Biagio Ciuffo
Keyword(s):  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Traffic Routing

A Non-Cooperative Game Analysis of Competition between Content Providers in the Internet Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
M'hamed Outanoute ◽  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Rachid El Ayachi ◽  
Belaid Bouikhalene
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Internet Market

In internet market, content providers (CPs) continue to play a primordial role in the process of accessing different types of data. Competition in this area is fierce; customers are looking for providers that offer them good content (credibility of content and quality of service) with a reasonable price. In this work, the authors analyze this competition between CPs and the economic influence of their strategies on the market. The authors formulate their problem as a non-cooperative game among multiple CPs for the same market. Through a detailed analysis, the researchers prove uniqueness of a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE). Furthermore, a fully distributed algorithm to converge on the NE point is presented. In order to quantify how efficient the NE point is, a detailed analysis of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is adopted to ensure the performance of the system at equilibrium. Finally, an extensive numerical study is provided to describe the interactions between CPs and to point out the importance of quality of service (QoS) and credibility of content in the market.

Congestion Games, Load Balancing, and Price of Anarchy

2005 ◽  
pp. 13-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anshul Kothari ◽  
Subhash Suri ◽  
Csaba D. Tóth ◽  
Yunhong Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Load Balancing ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Congestion Games

scholarly journals Perfect sampling for infinite server and loss systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (03) ◽  
pp. 761-786 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Blanchet ◽  
Jing Dong
Keyword(s):  
Point Processes ◽  
Marked Point ◽  
Heavy Traffic ◽  
Arrival Rate ◽  
Marked Point Processes ◽  
Perfect Sampling ◽  
Running Time ◽  
Infinite Server ◽  
Loss Systems ◽  
Server System

We present the first class of perfect sampling (also known as exact simulation) algorithms for the steady-state distribution of non-Markovian loss systems. We use a variation of dominated coupling from the past. We first simulate a stationary infinite server system backwards in time and analyze the running time in heavy traffic. In particular, we are able to simulate stationary renewal marked point processes in unbounded regions. We then use the infinite server system as an upper bound process to simulate the loss system. The running time analysis of our perfect sampling algorithm for loss systems is performed in the quality-driven (QD) and the quality-and-efficiency-driven regimes. In both cases, we show that our algorithm achieves subexponential complexity as both the number of servers and the arrival rate increase. Moreover, in the QD regime, our algorithm achieves a nearly optimal rate of complexity.

scholarly journals The price of anarchy — on the roads and in football

Significance ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Skinner ◽  
Brad Carlin
Keyword(s):  
Price Of Anarchy

Terminal Ranking Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhan Bayraktar ◽  
Yuchong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Mean Field Game ◽  
Reward Functions

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrödinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players’ welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.

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