This paper explores the determinants of ministerial duration within the German
Länder between 1990 and 2010. In arguing that different terminal events ceasing
ministerial tenures should be analyzed separately, it distinguishes four exit
types: voluntary, forced, collective (ministers leaving office because their whole
party does so) and exits that are neither volitional acts of the minister nor politically
induced. Depending on the exit type, competing-risks Cox-models show
different effects for one and the same variable on the hazard for ministerial
turnover. Seniority in high-level politics for example helps not to be forced out
of office while it has no effect on voluntary or collective exits. Heading an
important ministry on the other hand increases the chances to rise to other positions
in high politics or private business, but does not impact the other two hazards.
The analysis furthermore shows that the principal-agent-logic known from
Westminster systems with the prime minister being largely sovereign in hiring
and firing cabinet members must be adapted to the German context of frequent
coalition governments. In coalition governments, only ministers from the same
party as the prime minister exhibit higher hazards for forced exits, while ministers
from other coalition partners are much safer in that regard.
The alpha-saturation and terminal events in dolichol biosynthesis.
