Last dance or second chance? Firm performance, CEO career horizon, and the separation of board leadership roles

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 808-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Krause ◽  
Matthew Semadeni
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Second Chance

The Role of Board Leadership Structure in Firm Governance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Chair ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.

Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Listed Companies in Sri Lanka

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Saseela Balagobei ◽  
K.G.A. Udayakumara
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Corporate Governance as a mechanism helps to align management's goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. The aim of this study is to identify the relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance of listed companies in Sri Lanka during the period of 2014-2016. The data was collected from the secondary data sources and board leadership structure is measured by CEO duality. The sample of this study consists of 100 firms listed in Colombo Stock Exchange based on market capitalization. For the purpose of data analysis, Pearson’s correlation analysis and independent sample t-test were used to examine the hypotheses of this study. The findings reveal that board leadership structure is positively correlated with firm performance in terms of Tobin’s Q and there is no significant difference in firm performance between CEO duality firms & non-duality firms.

Board leadership, board meeting frequency and firm performance in two‐tier boards

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Md Arafat Hossain ◽  
Elaine Yen Nee Oon
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Board Meeting ◽  
Board Leadership

Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 785-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Kang ◽  
Asghar Zardkoohi
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Female Board Leadership, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuxiu Jiang ◽  
Jun-Koo Kang ◽  
Jungmin Kim ◽  
Bing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Board Leadership

scholarly journals Board leadership structure and performance of Chinese firms in Singapore

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-629
Author(s):  
Ricky W. F. Pang ◽  
Abul F. M. Shamsuddin
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Chinese Firms ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

We examine the effects of board leadership structure on the performance of Chinese firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Using a sample of 105 firms covering 2009 to 2011, we find that CEO duality positively affects firm performance that can largely be explained by stewardship theory. There is also support for contingency theory as the CEO duality-firm performance relationship depends on whether Chinese firms are incorporated in Singapore or otherwise. This study offers insights for corporate regulators to soften their stance on the monitoring clauses concerning CEO duality. Major stakeholders in Singapore-based Chinese firms may need to bring some balance to board independence, board size, and the nomination process, particularly where CEO duality improves firm performance.

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