Evidence from 1992 to 2019 on the dynamics of managerial authority and CEO remuneration during company crises

We investigate the dynamics of two governance constructs, management influence over the board of directors and CEO remuneration, in enterprises in crisis from 1992 to 2019. Data reveal a strong trend of improving governance over time, which confounds the conclusion concerning the impact of distress on governance. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator to control for secular trends, we find that distressed businesses cut management board appointments and CEO compensation, deepen managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The performance-related component of CEO remuneration accounts for the majority of changes in CEO compensation in troubled businesses, which is consistent with the "shareholder value" perspective on CEO compensation.

Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts

Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cash bonuses. In addition, we provide evidence that firms substitute earnings measures with measures less subject to earnings management. Our findings are robust to potential alternative explanations, extend to an implicit relation between earnings and compensation for a larger sample, and are not driven by the tendency toward an overlapping committee structure more broadly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Accounting Performance Goals in CEO Compensation Contracts and Corporate Risk Taking

This study provides the first large-sample archival evidence on the impact of three commonly used accounting performance goals (thresholds, targets, and maximums) in CEO compensation contracts on corporate risk taking. Using proxy statement disclosure on performance goals for CEOs of U.S. public companies, we find that lower thresholds and higher maximums are associated with greater corporate risk taking, and these results are more pronounced when CEOs have greater incentives to achieve accounting performance goals or have lower innate risk aversion. In addition, we find that target difficulty is not significantly associated with corporate risk taking after controlling for thresholds and maximums. Finally, we find that CEO compensation contracts are more likely to have lower thresholds and higher maximums when risk taking is more value-enhancing or when R&D investment is more profitable, consistent with boards setting performance goals to induce an appropriate amount of corporate risk taking. Our study contributes to the accounting literature on target setting and corporate risk taking by identifying accounting performance goals as a tool in executive compensation contract design to influence risk taking. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Corporate Social Responsibility, CEO Compensation Structure, and Corporate Innovation Activities

This study empirically investigated the economic effect of CSR initiatives on innovation by examining Korean firms. Our primary objective of this study was to explore how a CEO compensation system can affect the CSR-innovation relationship. An integrated model of the impact of CSR on innovation activities was developed through analyzing various CEO compensation components such as structure, type, mix, and distribution. We identified the CEO compensation system that more suitably supports CSR in driving innovation performance improvement, and empirically examined a compensation system that enhances corporate innovation by creating a good alignment with CSR. Using a longitudinal data, we empirically tested the interactive effect of a CSR and compensation system of CEO in Korean publicly traded companies. Our empirical findings concerning the interaction between CSR strategies and CEO compensation schemes hold practical implications for establishing and implementing a suitable human resource system to improve organizational competitiveness.

CEO Compensation in Korea: Is It Different Than in the US? A Comparison between Korean Non-Life Insurance Firms and US Property-Liability Insurance Firms

This study investigates the level, structure, and pay-for-performance relationship of CEO compensation in Korean non-life insurance companies. We find that seniority plays an important role in setting CEO compensation practices and that performance-based pay, such as bonus, is more effective than base salary in enhancing shareholder value for Korean non-life insurers. Unlike previous studies that show that international differences in executive pay have been diminished considerably since the 2000s, our evidence shows that there is a remarkable difference in CEO compensation between Korean non-life insurers and U.S. property-liability insurers. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the pay-performance relationship is weaker in Korean non-life insurance companies relative to US counterparts, suggesting that it is necessary for Korean non-life insurers to tie performance-based compensation more closely to shareholder value in the design of CEO compensation.