scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions

2005 ◽  
pp. 852-852
Author(s):  
Eric Hsu ◽  
Sheila McIlraith
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Preference Aggregation

scholarly journals Logical mechanism design

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iyad Rahwan ◽  
Kate Larson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Research Agenda ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Early Research ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Logical Inference

AbstractGame theory is becoming central to the design and analysis of computational mechanisms in which multiple entities interact strategically. The tools of mechanism design are used extensively to engineer incentives for truth revelation into resource allocation (e.g. combinatorial auctions) and preference aggregation protocols (e.g. voting). We argue that mechanism design can also be useful in the design of logical inference procedures. In particular, it can help us understand and engineer inference procedures when knowledge is distributed among self-interested agents. We set a research agenda for this emerging area, and point to some early research efforts.

Bayesian Mechanism Design

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aranyak Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design

Combined Blocking Contours Concept for a Single-Row Planetary Mechanism Design

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Olga V. Egorova ◽  
Gennady A. Timofeev ◽  
Marina V. Samoilova
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Single Row ◽  
Planetary Mechanism

The New Lifting Bridge in Bordeaux, France- Mechanism Design Code Constraints and Freedoms

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (36) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Paul M Skelton ◽  
Keith R Griesing
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Code

A Democratic Preference Aggregation Model

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ismat Beg ◽  
Tabasam Rashid
Keyword(s):  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Aggregation Model
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