An Efficient Identity-Based Key Exchange Protocol with KGS Forward Secrecy for Low-Power Devices

Post-quantum public cryptosystems introduced so far do not define an scalable public key infrastructure for the quantum era. We demonstrate here a public certification system based in Lizama’s non-invertible Key Exchange Protocol which can be used to implement a public key infrastructure (PKI), secure, scalable, interoperable and efficient. We show functionality of certificates across different certification domains. Finally, we discuss that non-invertible certificates can exhibit Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).

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Certificateless Non-Interactive Key Exchange Protocol with Forward Secrecy

Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology ◽

10.13089/jkiisc.2015.25.3.531 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 25 (3) ◽

pp. 531-546

Author(s):

Young Kyung Lee ◽

Ji Eun Eom ◽

Seung-Hyun Seo ◽

Dong Hoon Lee

Keyword(s):

Key Exchange ◽

Key Exchange Protocol ◽

Forward Secrecy

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A Provably Secure Revocable ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

The Scientific World JOURNAL ◽

10.1155/2014/367264 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-10 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Tsu-Yang Wu ◽

Tung-Tso Tsai ◽

Yuh-Min Tseng

Keyword(s):

Key Exchange ◽

Public Key ◽

Key Exchange Protocol ◽

Forward Secrecy ◽

Group Key ◽

Computation Technique ◽

Group Key Exchange ◽

Security Properties ◽

Authenticated Group Key ◽

Provably Secure

The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.

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