Discretionary Access Control Policies (DAC)

Author(s):  
Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati
2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 839-875 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHELE BUGLIESI ◽  
DARIO COLAZZO ◽  
SILVIA CRAFA ◽  
DAMIANO MACEDONIO

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) systems provide powerful resource management mechanisms based on the selective distribution of capabilities to selected classes of principals. We study a type-based theory of DAC models for a process calculus that extends Cardelli, Ghelli and Gordon's pi-calculus with groups (Cardelliet al. 2005). In our theory, groups play the role of principals and form the unit of abstraction for our access control policies, and types allow the specification of fine-grained access control policies to govern the transmission of names, bound the (iterated) re-transmission of capabilities and predicate their use on the inability to pass them to third parties. The type system relies on subtyping to achieve a selective distribution of capabilities to the groups that control the communication channels. We show that the typing and subtyping relationships of the calculus are decidable. We also prove a type safety result, showing that in well-typed processes all names:(i)flow according to the access control policies specified by their types; and(ii)are received at the intended sites with the intended capabilities.We illustrate the expressive power and the flexibility of the typing system using several examples.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Bouganim ◽  
Francois Dang Ngoc ◽  
Philippe Pucheral

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piero Bonatti ◽  
Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati ◽  
Pierangela Samarati

Author(s):  
Thanh-Nhan Luong ◽  
Hanh-Phuc Nguyen ◽  
Ninh-Thuan Truong

The software security issue is being paid great attention from the software development community as security violations have emerged variously. Developers often use access control techniques to restrict some security breaches to software systems’ resources. The addition of authorization constraints to the role-based access control model increases the ability to express access rules in real-world problems. However, the complexity of combining components, libraries and programming languages during the implementation stage of web systems’ access control policies may arise potential flaws that make applications’ access control policies inconsistent with their specifications. In this paper, we introduce an approach to review the implementation of these models in web applications written by Java EE according to the MVC architecture under the support of the Spring Security framework. The approach can help developers in detecting flaws in the assignment implementation process of the models. First, the approach focuses on extracting the information about users and roles from the database of the web application. We then analyze policy configuration files to establish the access analysis tree of the application. Next, algorithms are introduced to validate the correctness of the implemented user-role and role-permission assignments in the application system. Lastly, we developed a tool called VeRA, to automatically support the verification process. The tool is also experimented with a number of access violation scenarios in the medical record management system.


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