Stochastic Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Games with General Nonlinear Payoffs

Author(s):  
Shu-Jun Liu ◽  
Miroslav Krstic
2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1659-1679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu-Jun Liu ◽  
Miroslav Krstić

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 3234-3239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu-Jun Liu ◽  
Miroslav Krstić

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document