This chapter is largely an examination of the significance one of Frege’s views has for contemporary thought. The view, which was labeled the “apparently absurd view” in Chapter 6, is that (1) it is appropriate to give definitions of terms already in use that are, in part, stipulative and (2) it is appropriate to take sentences in which such terms appear as, already (pre-definition), having truth-values. It is argued that, although this view may seem absurd, it is perfectly in line with some scientific practices, in particular unexceptionable practices routinely used in epidemiology. If we follow Hilary Putnam’s view about the significance of our deference to experts, we should accept Frege’s apparently absurd view as not absurd in the least. Moreover, what we see on examination of this view are reasons for rejecting a number of contemporary views about vague language, including those of Field, Fine, Fodor and Lepore, and Williamson.
German, Spanish and Mandarin speakers' metapragmatic awareness of vague language compared