Polynomial Representation Is Tricky: Maliciously Secure Private Set Intersection Revisited

2021 ◽  
pp. 721-742
Author(s):  
Aydin Abadi ◽  
Steven J. Murdoch ◽  
Thomas Zacharias
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Ou Ruan ◽  
Hao Mao

Private set intersection (PSI) allows participants to securely compute the intersection of their inputs, which has a wide range of applications such as privacy-preserving contact tracing of COVID-19. Most existing PSI protocols were based on asymmetric/symmetric cryptosystem. Therefore, keys-related operations would burden these systems. In this paper, we transform the problem of the intersection of sets into the problem of finding roots of polynomials by using point-value polynomial representation, blind polynomials’ point-value pairs for secure transportation and computation with the pseudorandom function, and then propose an efficient PSI protocol without any cryptosystem. We optimize the protocol based on the permutation-based hash technique which divides a set into multisubsets to reduce the degree of the polynomial. The following advantages can be seen from the experimental result and theoretical analysis: (1) there is no cryptosystem for data hiding or encrypting and, thus, our design provides a lightweight system; (2) with set elements less than 212, our protocol is highly efficient compared to the related protocols; and (3) a detailed formal proof is given in the semihonest model.


Author(s):  
Yalian Qian ◽  
Jian Shen ◽  
Pandi Vijayakumar ◽  
Pradip Kumar Sharma

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (3) ◽  
pp. 6-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Groce ◽  
Peter Rindal ◽  
Mike Rosulek

Abstract In this work we demonstrate that allowing differentially private leakage can significantly improve the concrete performance of secure 2-party computation (2PC) protocols. Specifically, we focus on the private set intersection (PSI) protocol of Rindal and Rosulek (CCS 2017), which is the fastest PSI protocol with security against malicious participants. We show that if differentially private leakage is allowed, the cost of the protocol can be reduced by up to 63%, depending on the desired level of differential privacy. On the technical side, we introduce a security model for differentially-private leakage in malicious-secure 2PC. We also introduce two new and improved mechanisms for “differentially private histogram overestimates,” the main technical challenge for differentially-private PSI.


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