Collision Attacks on CAESAR Second-Round Candidate: ELmD

2016 ◽  
pp. 122-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Zhang ◽  
Wenling Wu ◽  
Yafei Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Collision Attacks

Near-Collision Attacks on MD4: Applied to MD4-Based Protocols

2009 ◽  
Vol E92-A (1) ◽  
pp. 76-86
Author(s):  
Lei WANG ◽  
Kazuo OHTA ◽  
Noboru KUNIHIRO
Keyword(s):  
Collision Attacks

Quantum Collision Attacks on AES-Like Hashing with Low Quantum Random Access Memories

2020 ◽  
pp. 727-757
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Dong ◽  
Siwei Sun ◽  
Danping Shi ◽  
Fei Gao ◽  
Xiaoyun Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Random Access ◽  
Collision Attacks

scholarly journals Quantum Free-Start Collision Attacks on Double Block Length Hashing with Round-Reduced AES-256

2021 ◽  
pp. 316-336
Author(s):  
Amit Kumar Chauhan ◽  
Abhishek Kumar ◽  
Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Compression Function ◽  
Collision Attack ◽  
Classical Setting ◽  
Quantum Version ◽  
Collision Attacks ◽  
Double Block Length

Recently, Hosoyamada and Sasaki (EUROCRYPT 2020), and Xiaoyang Dong et al. (ASIACRYPT 2020) proposed quantum collision attacks against AES-like hashing modes AES-MMO and AES-MP. Their collision attacks are based on the quantum version of the rebound attack technique exploiting the differential trails whose probabilities are too low to be useful in the classical setting but large enough in the quantum setting. In this work, we present dedicated quantum free-start collision attacks on Hirose’s double block length compression function instantiated with AES-256, namely HCF-AES-256. The best publicly known classical attack against HCF-AES-256 covers up to 9 out of 14 rounds. We present a new 10-round differential trail for HCF-AES-256 with probability 2−160, and use it to find collisions with a quantum version of the rebound attack. Our attack succeeds with a time complexity of 285.11 and requires 216 qRAM in the quantum-attack setting, where an attacker can make only classical queries to the oracle and perform offline computations. We also present a quantum free-start collision attack on HCF-AES-256 with a time complexity of 286.07 which outperforms Chailloux, Naya-Plasencia, and Schrottenloher’s generic quantum collision attack (ASIACRYPT 2017) in a model when large qRAM is not available.

Efficient collision attacks on smart card implementations of masked AES

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
An Wang ◽  
ZongYue Wang ◽  
XueXin Zheng ◽  
XiaoMei Wang ◽  
Man Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Smart Card ◽  
Collision Attacks
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