Nash Equilibria in Network Facility Location Under Delivered Prices

Author(s):  
Blas Pelegrı́n ◽  
Pascual Fernández ◽  
Maria D. Garcı́a
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 999-1017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blas Pelegrín ◽  
Pascual Fernández ◽  
María Dolores García

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artchapong Hassametto ◽  
Preerawadee Chaiboontun ◽  
Chattraporn Prajuabwan ◽  
Laphatrada Khammuang ◽  
Aussadavut Dumrongsiri

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (11) ◽  
pp. 83-89
Author(s):  
Vairaprakash Gurusamy ◽  
◽  
◽  
K. Nandhini

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