Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory

2018 ◽  
pp. 71-86
Author(s):  
Michael Cholbi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Expertise

scholarly journals A Philosopher’s Guide to Discounting

2021 ◽  
pp. 90-110
Author(s):  
Kian Mintz-Woo
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Significant Issue ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Moral Expertise ◽  
Ramsey Rule

This chapter introduces several distinctions relevant to what is called the “discounting problem”, since the issue is how (future) costs and benefits are discounted to make them comparable in present terms. The author defends the claim that there are good reasons to adopt Ramsey-style discounting in the context of climate change: the Ramsey rule is robust, flexible, and well-understood. An important distinction involved in discounting—“descriptivism” and “prescriptivism”—is discussed. It is argued that, even if we adopt prescriptivism, and accept that this means there is need for moral experts in parameter assignments, there is a significant issue. The type of moral expertise required for the discounting problem will not involve knowledge of moral theory—thus making moral philosophy unhelpful in terms of making particular parameter assignments, despite these being substantive moral judgments.

Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Moral Theory in the Fiction of Isabelle de Charri�re: The Case ofThree Women

Hypatia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Emma Rooksby
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Relational Ethics and Partiality

Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (152) ◽  
pp. 53-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Motsamai Molefe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Relational Ethics ◽  
The Individual

AbstractIn this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the ‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right.

Bad Actors in Moral Theory

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doug Magendanz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory
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