Moral Assessments and Legal Categories

In this chapter, I examine the discussion around the rational and moral basis for legal categories in postclassical Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī legal theory. The debate was pushed forward by the Akhbārī movement in the 17th century CE; they proposed a novel position concerning the rational basis for the law in which reason can determine certain moral aspects of an action (e.g., a good action can be recognised by reason, and its performance attracts praise), but not legal elements (e.g., that the performance of a good action deserves a reward beyond praise). This leaves, for them, the Lawgiver (that is, God) to connect the moral aspects of an act with its legal consequences (that is punishment for a morally bad action and reward for a morally good action); that causal connection cannot be made by reason alone. Based on these findings, I conclude that Akhbārī moral theory, often read along literalist lines, showcases an adherence to the Muʿtazilī-derived framework common to the Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī theology and law generally, whilst also reserving ultimate legal authority to God.

Vital Force

Chapter 5 addresses the moral theory suggested by the African tradition according to which one is obligated to promote (or honour) liveliness in oneself and others. This sort of principle has been advanced by philosophers such as Noah Dzobo, Bénézet Bujo, and Laurenti Magesa. Vitalism is a globally under-explored approach to right action that deserves much more consideration. However, the chapter concludes that it cannot account for some comparatively uncontroversial moral claims salient in the African tradition. Sometimes settling for majoritarian rule and avoiding reconciliation in respect of criminal justice would best promote (or honour) liveliness, and yet most African philosophers would judge these actions to be wrong to some degree. The chapter also argues that vitalism cannot account for certain intuitions with a global scope; forbidding interracial marriage and deceiving people might best promote (or honour) liveliness, but ethicists around the world would judge these actions to be pro tanto immoral.

A Relational Moral Theory

Chapter 7, which completes Part II, appeals to the conception of harmony/communality from the previous chapter to articulate a new deontological moral theory, which prescribes respect for beings insofar as they are by nature capable of communing as a subject or being communed with as an object. What typically makes actions wrong is, roughly, that they are not friendly towards or harmonious with innocent parties, where particularly wrongful behaviour is unfriendly or discordant in respect of them. The chapter draws out several corollaries from an ethic of rightness as friendliness, such as that one normally should not promote harmony using a very discordant means, and that having befriended someone provides extra reason to help him compared to a stranger. The chapter demonstrates that this moral theory, in the light of its corollaries, accounts better for the African and global intuitions than the welfarist and vitalist approaches considered earlier in Part II.

Environmental Ethics

This chapter begins Part III, which argues that the relational moral theory of rightness as friendliness is a strong competitor to Western principles in many applied ethical contexts. Chapter 8 articulates and defends a novel, relational account of moral status, according to which an entity is owed moral consideration roughly to the degree that it is capable of being party to a communal relationship. One of its implications is that many animals have a moral status but not one as high as ours, which many readers will find attractive, but which utilitarianism and Kantianism cannot easily accommodate. Relational moral status also grounds a promising response to the ‘argument from marginal cases’ that animals have the same moral status as incapacitated humans: even if two beings have identical intrinsic properties, they can differ in the extent to which they can relate and hence differ in their degree of moral status.

Reconsidering Ontology’s Relevance

This chapter and the next are methodological, focused on how to justify a moral theory. Many African philosophers believe that ethical claims follow immediately from ‘external’, metaphysical ones about human nature that must be established first. For example, Kwame Nkrumah maintains that an egalitarian ethic follows directly from a prior physicalist ontology, and Kwame Gyekye contends that his ‘moderate communitarian’ morality is derived from a certain conception of the self. Chapter 2 shows how these and similar rationales fail to clear the ‘is/ought gap’, as it is known in Western meta-ethics, and also how strategies one might use to bridge the gap do not work. It concludes that a more suitable way to defend a moral theory is to argue ‘internally’ to morality by appealing to intuitions, i.e., by determining which comparatively more controversial general principle of right action easily entails and best explains less controversial particular moral claims.

Epilogue

At the end of the first chapter (1.5), I noted that, since having moved to an African country, I have considered myself to have had a moral obligation to engage with its intellectual traditions when teaching and researching. I would have rightly felt guilt had I taught merely Western ethics to African students and contributed only Euro-American-Australasian perspectives to journals published in the sub-Saharan region. Having been principally trained as an analytic moral and political philosopher, I have been in a good position to articulate normative-theoretic interpretations of African morality, to evaluate these moral theories by appealing to intuitions, and to apply them to a range of practical controversies. Now, it would be welcome if the relational moral theory I have defended in this book could explain why I had a duty to make such a contribution to the field. And indeed it does. I have had an obligation of some weight to teach and research African philosophical ideas as I am particularly able to do so for a reason that is by now familiar to the reader. In the way that a newly trained doctor has an obligation of some weight to give something back to his country before emigrating (...

Education Ethics

Chapter 11 reflects on what educators owe students in higher education institutions and the broader society when it comes to which knowledge to teach. It points out how utilitarianism and Kantianism naturally ground a cosmopolitan approach to instructing matters of culture, whereas the communal ethic does not. Rightness as friendliness instead supports prioritizing local cultures, an implication that is defended. The chapter also notes how the relational moral theory probably entails that it is right to strive to develop students’ virtue, a view that is not salient in the works of those who adhere to the Western ethical principles. Finally, the chapter considers the question of whether it can be right to instruct some knowledge for its own sake. Doing so seems ruled out by utilitarianism and Kantianism, but the relational moral theory is shown to admit of an interpretation that would permit it.

A Relational Moral Theory

A Relational Moral Theory provides a new answer to the long-standing question of what all morally right actions might have in common as distinct from wrong ones, by drawing on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the African philosophical tradition. The book points out that the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the two rivals that have dominated Western moral theory for about two centuries, share an individualist premise. Once that common assumption is replaced by a relational perspective that has been salient in African ethical thought, a different comprehensive principle focused on harmony or friendliness emerges, one that is shown to correct the blind spots of the Western principles and to have implications for a wide array of applied controversies that an international audience of moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and similar thinkers will find attractive.

The Common Good

Chapter 4, which begins Part II, addresses the moral theory from the African tradition according to which one is obligated to promote the common good without violating individual rights. This principle has been advanced by Kwame Gyekye, one of the most widely discussed African moral philosophers of the past twenty-five years. His ‘moderate communitarian’ ethic, although focused on promoting well-being, differs from Western utilitarianism, such that one cannot argue against the former by invoking well-known criticisms of the latter. The chapter advances fresh reasons for rejecting Gyekye’s welfarist approach to morality, principally on the ground that it does a poor job of capturing several intuitions salient in the African tradition. Sometimes permitting great inequalities of wealth, being competitive in the economic sphere, and undermining cultures can best improve well-being without violating individual rights, yet many African philosophers would judge these actions to be wrong to some degree.

Introduction

Chapter 1 explains and motivates the project of advancing an African moral theory, after which it provides an overview of the book. An African moral theory is a basic, comprehensive principle distinguishing right from wrong actions that is informed by mores salient particularly in the sub-Saharan region. It is advanced as a rival to the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the primary Western answers to the important question of what all right actions have in common. Part I of the book discusses the meta-ethical issue of how to justify an African moral theory. Part II identifies three major candidates for a moral theory in the African tradition, and argues that one, grounded on communal relationship, is most promising. Part III argues that the relational moral theory does better than the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy at accounting for a wide array of applied controversies.