A Characterization of Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria in PCTL Augmented with a Cost Quantifier

2010 ◽  
pp. 158-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Arturo Góngora ◽  
David A. Rosenblueth
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Mixed Strategy

scholarly journals On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavlo Prokopovych ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Mixed Strategy

Competitive Framing

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Spiegler
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Behavioral Industrial Organization ◽  
Marketing Messages

I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is “frame-dependent,” and firms use costless “marketing messages” to influence the consumer’s frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the “behavioral industrial organization” literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property. I use this result to analyze the equilibrium interplay between competition and framing in a variety of applications. (JEL D43, D82, M31)

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