Ordinal preference theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 59-92
Author(s):  
Harald Wiese
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jengnan Tzeng ◽  
Chung-Cheng Lin ◽  
Shinn-Shyr Wang
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yucheng Dong ◽  
Yao Li ◽  
Ying He ◽  
Xia Chen

Preference–approval structure combines the preference information of both ranking and approval, which extends the ordinal preference model by incorporating two categories of choice alternatives, that is, acceptable (good) and unacceptable (bad), in the preference modeling process. In this study, we present some axioms that imply the existence of a unique distance function of preference–approval structures. Based on theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, we further study a preferences aggregation model in the group decision-making context based on the proposed axiomatic distance function. In this model, the group preference is defined as a preference–approval structure that minimizes the sum of its distances to all preference–approval structures of individuals in the group under consideration. Particularly, we show that the group preference defined by the axiomatic distance–based aggregation model has close relationships with the simple majority rule and Cook and Seiford’s ranking.


2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Hausman

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.


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