Blame Avoidance as Motivating Force in the First Price Sealed Bid Private Value Auction

2001 ◽  
pp. 333-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhard Selten
Author(s):  
Lixin Ye

We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants' valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthermore, if the information potentially available to bidders after entry is sufficiently rich, then the Vickrey auction, up to its equivalent class, is also the only optimal sealed-bid auction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 275-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahul Deb ◽  
Mallesh M. Pai

Discrimination (for instance, along the lines of race or gender) is often prohibited in auctions. This is legally enforced by preventing the seller from explicitly biasing the rules in favor of bidders from certain groups (for example, by subsidizing their bids). In this paper, we study the efficacy of this policy in the context of a single object: independent private value setting with heterogeneous bidders. We show that restricting the seller to using an anonymous, sealed bid auction format (or, simply, a symmetric auction) imposes virtually no restriction on her ability to discriminate. Our results highlight that the discrepancy between the superficial impartiality of the auction rules and the resulting fairness of the outcome can be extreme. (JEL D44, D82)


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Zarnoth ◽  
Angela Nguyen ◽  
Lesley A. Hernandez ◽  
Whitney Wright ◽  
Carol V. Evans

Optik ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167039
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose

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