A model for sealed-bid auctions with independent private value and common value components

1990 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-125
Author(s):  
J. Richard Harrison
1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Walker ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
James C. Cox

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.


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