scholarly journals Development of a New Mathematical Framework for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants – Plan and Current Status –

2016 ◽  
pp. 137-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hitoshi Muta ◽  
Ken Muramatsu ◽  
Osamu Furuya ◽  
Tomoaki Uchiyama ◽  
Akemi Nishida ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Probabilistic Risk

scholarly journals Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Station Blackouts in Nuclear Power Plants

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 494-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hindolo George-Williams ◽  
Min Lee ◽  
Edoardo Patelli
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment ◽  
Probabilistic Risk

Augmenting Probabilistic Risk Assessment With Malevolent Initiators

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis Smith ◽  
David Schwieder ◽  
Trond Bjornard
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment ◽  
Vulnerability Assessments ◽  
Equipment Failures ◽  
Random Failures ◽  
Probabilistic Risk

As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This work explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering “random” failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.

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