Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law

1983 ◽  
pp. 123-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest J. Weinrib
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Negligence Law

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RISKING

Legal Theory ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Oberdiek
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Negligence Law

What makes careless conduct careless is easily one of the deepest and most contested questions in negligence law, tort theory, and moral theory. Answering it involves determining the conditions that make the imposition of risk unjustifiable, wrong, or impermissible. Yet there is a still deeper as well as overlooked and undertheorized question: Why does subjecting others to risk of harm call for justification in the first place? That risk can be impermissibly imposed upon others—that is, the very possibility of negligence—presupposes that imposing risk is the kind of thing that can be impermissible. Unless imposing risk can be impermissible after all, unjustified risking is literally impossible. In this discussion, I explore what I call the moral significance of risking, arguing that the moral significance of risking resides in a certain kind of nonmaterial autonomy interest that is implicated whenever one imposes risk of harm on another.

Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law

1983 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest J. Weinrib
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Negligence Law

Toward a moral theory of negligence law

1983 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest J. Weinrib
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Negligence Law

Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Moral Theory in the Fiction of Isabelle de Charri�re: The Case ofThree Women

Hypatia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Emma Rooksby
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory

Relational Ethics and Partiality

Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (152) ◽  
pp. 53-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Motsamai Molefe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Relational Ethics ◽  
The Individual

AbstractIn this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the ‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right.

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