Civil Recourse Theory

This chapter examines civil recourse theory. The phrase “civil recourse theory” has developed two connotations, suggesting: (1) a structural theory of the normative underpinnings of private law liability placing primary emphasis on a plaintiff’s right of redress and the role of the state in affording plaintiffs the power to exact damages from those who have violated the plaintiff’s legal rights; and (2) a distinctive, overarching tort theory that emphasizes a plaintiff’s right of redress while simultaneously emphasizing relational duty in negligence law and torts as legal wrongs. The chapter identifies several other views developed in connection with civil recourse theory but meant to stand apart from it. The thesis that negligence law’s duty of care is relational is among them; so too is the thesis that tort law consists of specifications of legal wrongs, that these wrongs are defined in relatively strict manner, and that plaintiffs must have an injury to prevail on a tort claim. Deploying the narrower conception of civil recourse theory, the chapter defends the principle of civil recourse as a matter of political morality and depicts the place of private rights of action in the basic structure of a just liberal democracy.

Privity

This chapter discusses privity rules. Privity rules in contract law prevented obligations created by a contract from protruding on third parties, while privity rules in tort law prevented obligations to third parties that might otherwise be imposed by tort law from “indenting” upon a contract. Contract no longer is an impregnable circle of obligation. But contract law still has a privity requirement that prevents a contract from protruding negatively on nonparties. Meanwhile, in tort law, the function of preventing negligence law from indenting upon a contract has devolved to rules that preclude a negligence claim for pure economic loss. Moreover, there are rules in property law and the law of restitution that perform the same functions as the old privity rules in contract law and negligence. These include bona fide purchaser rules in property law and rules in the law of restitution that preclude claims for indirect enrichment and that preserve the priority of contract as a mechanism for resolving problems of unjust enrichment.

A Moment's Inadvertence Should Not Bring Down the Heavens: Rethinking Proportionality in Negligence Law in New Zealand

True proportionality between the degree of a tortfeasor's fault and the extent of a plaintiff's loss is unachievable in negligence law in New Zealand. As Mallon J's judgment in Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General highlighted, the concept of proportionality can only be used to negate an alleged tortfeasor's duty of care, thereby eliminating the potential for liability. This approach does not accommodate differing levels of disproportionality. Moreover, relying on negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms to achieve proportionality, as Mallon J did in Strathboss, will not always be fruitful; there may still be a large gap between what a defendant has done and what the defendant is held accountable for. The extent of a tortfeasor's liability may depend on luck rather than principle. However, internationally, the wrongful conception and birth cases reveal a more nuanced use of proportionality: reducing the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care. While this may be seen as inconsistent with negligence law's compensatory objective, I argue that a tortfeasor's interest in being free from undue burdens should constrain this objective, where necessary. This article develops on the reasoning in the wrongful conception and birth cases and borrows from the language of the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 to create a general mechanism for limiting a tortfeasor's liability in the interests of proportionality. The proposed mechanism aims to ensure that the law of negligence delivers more just results.

Multital Jural Relations

This chapter advances a number of criticisms of Hohfeld’s ‘multital’ analysis of rights in rem. The chapter shows: (1) that Hohfeld confuses the connections between rights and duties, in particular rights in rem and general and special rights, and general duties; (2) that the claim that the general norm not to interfere with the property of others is not a public law duty, as some, relying upon Hohfeld, have claimed; (3) that the duty of care in negligence law cannot be squared with Hohfeldian analysis; and (4), that it individuates duties incorrectly.

The Introduction of Duty into English Law and the Development of the Legal Subject

‘Duty’ is a term that is used in several areas of the law—notably the ‘duty of care’ and ‘fiduciary duty’. This article considers the introduction of the term ‘duty’ itself to the law, before it became part of the compound terms. In order to do so, the article surveys a range of sub-disciplines, including trusts, negligence law, defamation and employment law, to identify the earliest uses of the term. To explore the potential motivations for its incorporation, additional material, such as early modern legal and, later, political treatises, is considered. The conclusion is that the introduction of the term, while reactionary, may still be seen in terms of the development of the legal subject in the English common law.

Simplifying the Complexities of Negligence Law – A Joint Academic/Judicial Proposal

Over a century, common law judges, academics, and practitioners have struggled with the complexities of negligence law. All agree that negligence liability is imposed on a defendant whose unreasonable conduct caused foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, and who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. But views differ considerably as to the meaning and role of each element (unreasonable conduct, harm causation, duty), the test and the relevant considerations that should be applied to each, the interrelation between these elements, and the meaning and role of the foreseeability requirement in each element. Against this background, the author has argued for years that the above complexities can be easily solved by a simplified model of negligence. Recently the author’s model has been embraced by Israeli justices and judges. The article presents the proposed model, explains how it solves the described complexities, and fends off criticism. It then demonstrates the model’s operation by applying it to the 2018 SCC’s decision in the Rankin case. A glimpse at the Third Restatement on Torts shows that it steers in the same direction, as evidenced by an analysis of the Palsgraf case and the unforeseeable plaintiff question. Following a short overview of leading British cases from Donoghue to the 2018 decision in Robinson, it is argued that a shift to the proposed model would be a natural evolution that can be easily achieved. In contrast, it is argued that Canadian law has moved in another direction, for incorrect reasons. The model is then compared with another reform recently suggested in the literature. Finally, fault-based liability in continental Europe is viewed from the perspective of the proposed model.