Divine foreknowledge and alternative conceptions of human freedom

1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 19-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
William P. Alston
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

scholarly journals Is Human Freedom Compatible with Divine Foreknowledge?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 528-551
Author(s):  
Dean Lubin
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

On divine foreknowledge and human freedom: A reply

1980 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Rowe
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

Pike and Hoffman on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

1982 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 521-529
Author(s):  
Wesley Morriston ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

scholarly journals Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
Peter A. Graham ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

1994 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-107
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Flint ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge

Augustine on will, freedom, and foreknowledge: De libero arbitrio, III, 1–3

2015 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-332
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Third ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

AbstractTowards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.

Ockhamists and Molinists in Search of a Way Out

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-515
Author(s):  
Mark D. Linville
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past

If libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents have it within their power to bring it about that some world is actual. Against recent arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer an account of power over the past which takes this implication of libertarianism into consideration. I argue that the resulting account is available to Ockhamists and that it is immune to recent criticisms of the notion of counterfactual power over the past. But I contend that it is not an option for Molinists and that this fact leaves that position vulnerable to incompatibilist arguments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document