On Responsibility and Original Sin: A Molinist Suggestion

A crucial objection to the doctrine of original sin is that it conflicts with a common intuition that agents are morally responsible only for factors under their control. Here, I present an account of moral responsibility by Michael Zimmerman that accommodates that intuition, and I consider it as a model of original sin, noting both attractions and difficulties with the view.

Banez’s Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom

While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if it were true that freedom does not require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem.

Could God Love Cruelty?

One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents engage in cruelty? I argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence, some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objection. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related to (but less problematic than) existence internalism in metaethics. The theological voluntarist can maintain: Godcouldn’t have loved cruelty, and even though he could have willed behaviors we find abhorrent, he could only have done so in a world of deeply alien moral agents. We cannot confidently declare such a world unacceptable.

A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament: A Historical, Experimental, Comparative and Analytic Perspective

A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament: A Historical, Experimental, Comparative and Analytic Perspective, by Jaco Gericke. Routledge Publishing, 2020. Pp. viii + 163. $155.00 (hardcover).

Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection

Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.

History and Eschatology: Jesus and the Promise of Natural Theology

History and Eschatology: Jesus and the Promise of Natural Theology, by N. T. Wright. Baylor University Press, 2019. Pp. xx + 343. $34.95 (hardcover).

Worship and The Problem of Divine Achievement

Gwen Bradford has plausibly argued that one attains achievement only if one does something one finds difficult. It is also plausible that one must attain achievement to be worthy of “agential” praise, praise that is appropriately directed to someone on the basis of things that redound to their credit. These claims pose a challenge to classical theists who direct agential praise to God, since classical theism arguably entails that none of God’s actions are difficult for God. I consider responses to this challenge and commend a view according to which God’s loving character is not necessitated by God’s nature but is a contingent and difficult achievement. I argue that this view can still satisfy the explanatory ambitions of natural theology.

On St. Isaac The Syrian’s Argument Against Divine Retribution

Many theists maintain that God punishes humans retributively, whereby God intentionally harms those punished as their sins deserve, without also aiming qua punishment to contribute to the immediate or ultimate flourishing of those punished, or to the flourishing of some third (human) party. By contrast, St. Isaac the Syrian in effect contends that such an understanding of divine retribution is incompatible with a plausible understanding of God’s initial creative purposes of love and is thus untrue. In this paper, I present and substantially build upon Isaac’s contention, and I defend the resulting developed argument as a good argument worthy of further consideration.

Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment: Acts Of Assent

Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment: Acts of Assent, by Peter Forrest. Bloomsbury Academic. 2019. Pp. 208. $153 (hardcover).

Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature

Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature, by Jeffrey Koperski. Routledge, 2020. Pp. 160. $124.00 (hardcover).