I solve a discrete-time dynamic problem of profit maximization of the representative firm witha power-series adjustment cost function. I focus on the effect of government investment and ofseveral quality-of-institutions variables, such as control of corruption, political stability, andgovernment effectiveness, on private investment. To address this issue, I derive and estimatean Euler equation for investment (EEI) by Dynamic Programming as well as by Calculus-ofVariations. I estimate the EEI using the method of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)and annual aggregate data from a panel of 27 OECD countries over the period 1995-2015, aswell as from an expanded panel of 32 countries, to check the robustness of the estimates tosubstantial changes in the sample. My main findings are as follows: First, a crowding-in effectexists, i.e., government investment encourages private investment. Second, the conventional(quadratic) adjustment-cost function is too restrictive, whereas the power-series adjustmentcost function performs better. Third, according to the literature, previous specifications of theEEI fail empirically, whereas the one used here fares better.
Optimal Dynamic Investment Policy for Different Tax Depreciation Rates and Economic Depreciation Rates
