Gale's feasibility theorem on network flows and a bargaining set for cooperative TU games

Author(s):  
Irinel Dragan
2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (01) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
EVAN SHELLSHEAR

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.


2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 199-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC MEERTENS ◽  
J. A. M. POTTERS ◽  
J. H. REIJNIERSE

The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.


Game Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irinel Dragan

We give recursive definitions for the Banzhaf Value and the Semivalues of cooperative TU games. These definitions were suggested by the concept of potential for the Shapley Value due to Hart and Mas-Colell and by some results of the author who introduced the potentials of these values and the Power Game of a given game.


1997 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilio Calvo ◽  
Juan Carlos Santos

Author(s):  
Marc Daumas ◽  
Érik Martin-Dorel ◽  
Annick Truffert ◽  
Michel Ventou

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